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THE PATENTABILITY OF SEPARABILITY:
DESIGNING A TEST FOR “ARTICLE OF
MANUFACTURE” IDENTIFICATION IN
SECTION 289 OF THE PATENT ACT
Samantha M. Wald*
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Samsung Electronics v.
Apple Inc. regarding the meaning of the term “article of manufacture”
in Section 289 of the Patent Act neglects to resolve foundational
distinctions in the protected scope of multi-component devices. Cloaked
in ambiguity, the Court’s brief and ostensibly limited opinion critically
fails to demonstrate when the relevant “article of manufacture” should
be treated as the whole commercial product or as some smaller unit; nor
does it explain how to identify the relevant “article of manufacture” if it
is less than the product as a whole. Instead, the Supreme Court’s
dictionary-based definition of the term “article of manufacture” has
unearthed more questions than answers, the most salient being how to
identify the relevant “article of manufacture” and appropriate remedy
for infringement of multifaceted products.
This Article attempts to do what the United States Supreme Court
would not: it sets out a test for identifying the relevant “article of
manufacture” at step one of the Section 289 damages inquiry. Finding
inspiration in the copyright doctrine of separability, it advances a
statutory framework, judiciously delineating a more standardized
approach to “article of manufacture” identification in multi-component
devices. Specifically, through the development of a “separability” test,
this Article imposes a constructive foundation of statutory guidance that
does not broadly capture or exclude all components of the claimed
design. Instead, it proposes a workable standard that explicitly
determines when the component of an invention, rather than the
* LL.M., Intellectual Property Law, The George Washington University Law School,
2022; J.D., Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, 2020; B.A., Mathematics, Syracuse
University, 2017. A special thank you to my people—Monica, Steven, and Zachary—for
being a constant source of support and inspiration, always and forever. Because of you, I am
living my dream.
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invention itself, should constitute the relevant “article of manufacture.”
If implemented, this test would foster consistency in the practice of
design patent law by establishing predictability through the furtherance
of more precise guidelines.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The special disgorgement of profits remedy, codified in Section 289
of the Patent Act, and available exclusively for patentable designs,
provides that, for certain acts of design patent infringement, the infringer
“shall be liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit, but not less
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than $250.”1 The United States Supreme Court, in Samsung Electronics
Co. v. Apple Inc., announced a two-step test for “[a]rriving at a damages
award under [Section] 289 . . . [:] First, identify the ‘article of
manufacture’ to which the infringed design has been applied. Second,
calculate the infringer’s total profit made on that article of
manufacture.”2 Unfortunately, however, while the Court maintained
“that the ‘article of manufacture’ for which total profits are awarded
under [Section] 289 [need] not necessarily [be] limited to the product
that is sold to consumers, but may be either ‘a product sold to a consumer
[or] a component of that product,’ ” 3 it refused to “resolve whether . . .
the relevant article of manufacture [in Samsung] [wa]s the smartphone[]
or a particular smartphone component.”4 Nor would the Supreme Court
“set out a test for identifying the relevant article of manufacture at the
first step of the [Section] 289 damages inquiry.”5
Significantly, this fiercely contested, seven-year litigious battle—
concerning the infringement of design patents for the first-generation
iPhone—between Samsung Electronics and Apple Inc. fundamentally
propelled design patent law back into the limelight after more than a
century, occasioning the first United States Supreme Court decision on
the matter in over one hundred and twenty-five years.6 However, while
the Court’s momentous decision should have brought “clarity and
common sense to modern-day design patent law, particularly as it relates
to multi-component devices,” a salient question still remains: “namely,
how to determine the article of manufacture and appropriate remedy for
infringement of multifaceted products.”7 The U.S. Supreme Court
purported to resolve this problem, albeit unsuccessfully, by focusing on
1. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2020); see Sarah Burstein, Costly Designs, 77 OHIO ST.
L.J. 107, 118 n.74 (2016) (“[Section] 289 does not apply to all acts of design patent
infringement. . . . [I]t applies only to certain actions taken in the commercial context.”).
2. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 580 U.S. 53, 59 (2016).
3. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
119149, at *56 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Samsung Elecs. Co.,
580 U.S. at 60).
4. Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 62.
5. Id.
6. See Courtland Reichman & Bahrad Sokhansanj, Samsung V. Apple: Impacts Beyond
Damages, LAW360 (Dec. 11, 2016, 10:33 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/866580/
samsung-v-apple-impacts-beyond-damages; see also Tracy-Gene G. Durkin, The Design
Patent Case of the Century, STERNE KESSLER (July 2016), https://www.sternekessler.com/
news-insights/publications/design-patent-case-century [https://perma.cc/5PHC-XTA6].
7. G Nagesh Rao, Apple v. Samsung Retrial: An Opportunity to Finally Clarify Design
Patent Law, IPWATCHDOG (May 11, 2018, 7:15 AM), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/
05/11/apple-v-samsung-retrial-clarify-design-patent-law/id=97031/ [https://perma.cc/9H3YF7RK].

2022]

THE PATENTABILITY OF SEPARABILITY

601

the definition and scope of the term “article of manufacture.”8 Instead,
the Supreme Court’s brief and ostensibly limited opinion—which
neither establishes “when courts should treat the relevant article of
manufacture as the commercial product or as some smaller unit,” nor
explains “how one should identify the relevant article if it is less than the
product as a whole”9—has necessarily “unearthed foundational conflicts
in the scope of design patent claims.”10
The United States Supreme Court’s exceedingly broad, perhaps
overly simplified, reading of the term “article of manufacture” critically
fails to demonstrate when the relevant “article of manufacture” should
be treated as the whole commercial product or as some smaller
component thereof; nor does it identify how to categorically ascertain
the relevant “article of manufacture” if it is less than the product as a
whole. Absent a more definitive framework, the standard for determining
the relevant “article of manufacture,” as articulated by the Court, will
continue to sow confusion, “[f]or while [it is] true that not all articles of
manufacture are complete commercial products, neither should all
components be considered articles of manufacture.”11
This Article attempts to do what the United States Supreme Court
would not: it “set[s] out a test for identifying the relevant article of
manufacture at the first step of the [Section] 289 damages inquiry.”12 It
argues that, in determining a more appropriate “article of manufacture”
framework in Section 289 of the Patent Act, the courts should, to the
extent possible, adopt a definition of “article of manufacture” that more
closely mirrors the statutory term’s original meaning. In 1887, when
Congress first enacted the special “total profits” remedy for design
patent law, “the phrase ‘article of manufacture’ . . . referred to a tangible
item made by humans—other than a machine or composition of matter—
that had a unitary structure and was complete in itself for use or for
sale.”13 Accordingly, this Article develops a more standardized test for
“article of manufacture” identification at step one of the Section 289
damages inquiry that, like the statutory phrase’s early definition, does
8. See Mark McKenna, Designing Design Patent Subject Matter, JOTWELL (Mar. 22,
2018), https://ip.jotwell.com/designing-design-patent-subject-matter/ [https://perma.cc/Q8H3
-GVG8] (reviewing Sarah Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” in 1887, 32 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1 (2017), https://btlj.org/data/articles2017/vol32/32_1/burstein_web.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LZM9-AGXW]).
9. Id.
10. Reichman & Sokhansanj, supra note 6 (examining the inconsistencies “lurking under
the terse logic of Samsung”).
11. McKenna, supra note 8.
12. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 580 U.S. 53, 62 (2016).
13. Burstein, supra note 8, at 5.
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not broadly capture or exclude all components, but instead fundamentally
delineates when the component of an invention, rather than the invention
itself, constitutes the relevant “article of manufacture.” Specifically, it
proposes an unambiguous statutory framework that explicitly recognizes
that only those components that are physically separable from the whole
commercial product, and which may be “identifi[ed] as discrete parts
(even if ultimately combined into a bigger commercial product),” will
be considered the relevant “article of manufacture” in a multi-component
device.14 Moreover, finding inspiration in the copyright doctrine of
separability, this comprehensive legal approach to “article of
manufacture” identification advances a more constructive foundation of
statutory guidance. It establishes a workable standard for distinguishing
the components of a claimed design that constitute the relevant “article
of manufacture” from those that are merely incorporated features of the
commercial product itself. If adopted, this modern separability
framework to design patent law would provide predictability through the
furtherance of more precise guidelines, and thereby foster consistency in
the practice of design patent law.
To clarify, this Article does not suggest that the courts should
necessarily readopt the 1887 definition of the phrase “article of
manufacture,” but argues only that, in formulating an appropriate test for
“article of manufacture” identification in Section 289 of the Patent Act,
the statutory term’s historical context has significant implications that
may be consequential to the development of this modern framework.
Nor does this Article argue that the United States Supreme Court’s
dictionary-based interpretation of the scope of the term “article of
manufacture” is patently incorrect. Instead, it merely contends that,
based on the historical evidence, which demonstrates that the “article of
manufacture” in 1887 did not simply mean any “thing made by hand or
machine,”15 the Supreme Court’s definition of the statutory phrase,
without more, is too broad to effectuate any meaningful legal guidance.
Finally, while this Article does attempt to resolve the issue of how the
courts should identify the relevant “article of manufacture” at step one
of the Section 289 damages inquiry, it does not address the merits of the
United States government’s proposed test.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II provides a brief
introduction to the relevant fundamental principles of U.S. design patent
law. Part III carefully examines the highly contentious, seven-year legal

14. McKenna, supra note 8.
15. Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 60.
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battle between Apple and Samsung. Particular attention will be paid to
the United States Supreme Court’s focus on the meaning of the term
“article of manufacture,” within the framework of Section 289, to
determine how the statutory term of art is defined today. Part IV
explores what the phrase “article of manufacture” meant in 1887, when
Congress first enacted the “total profits” remedy and considers the
legislative history surrounding the statutory term’s early interpretation.
Part V offers a rudimentary understanding of the relevant policies and
practices of U.S. copyright law central to this discussion, which have
largely influenced the new legal framework subsequently proposed
herein. Lastly, Part VI explains why the Supreme Court’s broad,
dictionary-based definition of the term “article of manufacture,”
standing alone, fails to resolve critical foundational distinctions in the
protected scope of multi-component devices. This Section then
advances a potential blueprint for design patent law’s future success in
achieving a more systematic approach to “article of manufacture”
identification in Section 289 of the Patent Act. Finally, after applying
this new, categorical test to an assortment of patentable designs, this
Section reviews certain benefits associated with, and potentially
stemming from, the courts’ adoption of a more comprehensive legal
framework for determining the relevant “article of manufacture” under
the special “total profits” remedy provision.
II. BACKGROUND
The federal patent laws offer a meaningful form of protection, by
way of design patents, for “any new, original[,] and ornamental design
for an article of manufacture.”16 Design patent protection extends to “the
non-functional aspects of an ornamental design as shown in a patent.”17
Therefore, because “a design is manifested in appearance,” the subject
matter of a patentable design may comprise “the configuration or shape
of an article, . . . the surface ornamentation applied to an article, or . . .
the combination of configuration and surface ornamentation.”18 Simply
16. 35 U.S.C. § 171(a); see Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 55-56 (“The . . . patent laws
have long permitted those who invent designs for manufactured articles to patent their
designs.”).
17. Keystone Retaining Wall Sys., Inc. v. Westrock, Inc., 997 F.2d 1444, 1450 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (citing Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1188-89 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
18. See EDWARD LEE ET AL., THE LAW OF DESIGN: DESIGN PATENT, TRADEMARK, &
COPYRIGHT—PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 46 (2017); see also 8 DONALD S. CHISUM,
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 23.01 (2021); see also U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1504.01 (9th ed. Rev.
8, Jan. 2018) [hereinafter MPEP].
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put, the protection afforded by a design patent is limited exclusively to
the way an article looks; it does not extend to how that article works or
the way it is used.19
A. Requirements for Patentability
“A design, consisting of the configuration or surface ornamentation
of an article of manufacture, may be eligible for patenting only if it
satisfies the necessary prerequisites for design patentability: novelty,
nonobviousness, ornamentality, and definiteness.”20
1. The Novelty Requirement of the Patent Act
The novelty requirement, codified in Section 171 of the Patent Act,
dictates that, for the features of a claimed design to be patentable, it must
first be “new.”21 Consequently, because “[a] design is patentable for its
appearance,” the patentable novelty of a particular “design resides in the
novelty of appearance, and is measured by exhibiting and contemplating
the appearances of compared designs.”22 A design is deemed to exhibit
the requisite novelty under this comparative test of appearances “[i]f the
general or ensemble appearance-effect of a design is different from that

19. Unlike utility patents, which safeguard the functional and mechanical aspects of the
invention, design patents protect the visual appearance of a useful article. See LEE ET AL.,
supra note 18, at 58; see also 8 CHISUM, supra note 18, § 23.01 (“A design patent
fundamentally differs from a utility patent.”); see also MPEP, supra note 18, a§ 1502.01 (“[A]
‘utility patent’ protects the way an article is used and works . . . , while a ‘design patent’
protects the way an article looks . . . .”). Significantly, design patent protection is restricted
only to the exterior of a product and does not insulate its function, structure, or inner workings
from potential infringement. See Gene Quinn, Design Patents: The Under Utilized and
Overlooked Patent, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 10, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2016/09/10/design-patents/id=72714/ [https://perma.cc/N5WH-YCHM] (“Design patents do
NOT protect an idea or an invention, but rather only protect [the] ornamental design of exactly
what is pictured. . . . [T]he function, structure and interior workings of an invention [are the
province of utility patents] . . . .”).
20. Samantha M. Wald, Note, Siri, Define “Article of Manufacture”: Redesigning the
Definition of “Article of Manufacture” in Section 289 of the Patent Act, 38 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 569, 574 (2020), https://cardozoaelj.com/siri-define-article-of-manufactureredesigning-the-definition-of-article-of-manufacture-in-section-289-of-the-patent-act/; see
MPEP, supra note 18, § 1504; see also 8 CHISUM, supra note 18, § 23.03; see also LEE ET
AL., supra note 18, at 46. “The inventive novelty or unobviousness resides in the ornamental
shape or configuration of the article in which the design is embodied or the surface
ornamentation which is applied to or embodied in the design.” MPEP, supra note 18, § 1504.
The definiteness requirement, codified in Section 112(b) of the Patent Act, necessitates that a
claimed design “ ‘ particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter’ sought to be
patented.” LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 68 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112(b)).
21. See 35 U.S.C. § 171; see also 8 CHISUM, supra note 18, § 23.03(5).
22. WILLIAM D. SHOEMAKER, PATENTS FOR DESIGNS 76 (1929).
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of others in the eyes of ordinary observers.”23 The fundamental degree
of difference necessary to establish the novelty requirement is satisfied
“when the average observer takes the new design for a different, and not
a modified already-existing, design.”24 Therefore, to successfully
determine the novelty of a given design, the overall appearance of the
design itself must be observed in its entirety; it is immaterial “that any
one feature of a design is old, or [that] all the features are old, . . . as the
novelty can reside in the assemblage of [those] features, since it is the
appearance as a whole, and the impression it makes on the eye which
must be considered.”25
If the ornamental features of a claimed design are not “new” but are
instead substantially the same as an earlier design, the earlier design
constitutes a prior art reference that anticipates the appearance of the
subsequently claimed design.26 That is, where a single prior-art
reference “discloses each and every limitation of the relevant patent
claim . . . in a manner that . . . sufficiently enables others to reproduce
and use the claimed [design],” the claimed design “is said to be
‘anticipated’ by that reference and thus to lack novelty.”27 However,
where “no individual prior-art reference discloses all limitations of the
relevant patent claim,” the ornamental features of the claimed design are
“considered to satisfy patent law’s novelty requirement,” regardless of
“how seemingly trivial the difference between the claimed [design] and
any individual prior-art disclosure.”28
2. The Nonobviousness Requirement of the Patent Act
“The nonobviousness requirement fundamentally considers the
seemingly trivial differences between a claimed design and any
individual prior art disclosure to determine whether the design is

23. Id.
24. Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. 2019).
25. SHOEMAKER, supra note 22, at 77.
26. See id. at 99.
27. JOHN M. GOLDEN ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 181
(7th ed. 2018) (“The identity requirement for anticipation is . . . strict.”); see Schering Corp.
v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“A patent is invalid for
anticipation [under 35 U.S.C. § 102] if a single prior art reference discloses each and every
limitation of the claimed invention.”). “However, in some instances, where the ornamental
feature of a claimed design is necessarily present, or inherent, in the single prior-art reference,
that reference may anticipate without disclosing that feature.” Wald, supra note 20, at 575
n.29; see Allergan, Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 754 F.3d 952, 958 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Anticipation is
a question of fact that we review for clear error.”).
28. GOLDEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 181.
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sufficient to establish patentability.”29
Specifically, because
“[p]atentability is to depend . . . upon the ‘non-obvious’ nature of the
‘subject matter sought to be patented’ to a person having ordinary skill
in the pertinent art,”30 the patentability of a claimed design will be
negated under Section 103 of the Patent Act when “the differences
between [the] claimed [design] and the prior art are such that the claimed
[design] as a whole would have been obvious before [its] effective filing
date . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed
[design] pertains.”31 However, while the nonobviousness requirement
necessitates that the ornamental features of a claimed design be
significantly different from those of the prior art to maintain
patentability, it does not demand that they be intrinsically better.32
Therefore, “in determining the nonobviousness of [novel] designs under
[Section 103 of the Patent Act], . . . ‘[the] test is inherently . . . visual . . .
, for the design is nothing more than appearance, and the appearance is
that of the article as a whole.’ ” 33
3. Ornamentality vs. Functionality
“An ornamental design, within the framework of design patent law,
must present, by means of lines, images, configuration, and the like,
taken as a whole, an aesthetically pleasing appearance that is not dictated
solely by functional considerations.”34 To be ornamental, the design
must be “one which was ‘created for the purpose of ornamenting;’ ” it
cannot merely be “the result or ‘. . . by-product’ of functional or
mechanical considerations.”35 That is, where the overall appearance of
a particular design serves an intrinsically functional purpose, the design
is not primarily ornamental, but is instead “dictated by” its function, and,
as such, is therefore not entitled to design patent protection.36 Put

29. Wald, supra note 20, at 575-76; see GOLDEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 181.
30. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 14 (1966).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
32. See GOLDEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 397.
33. In re Zahn, 617 F.2d 261, 270 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (Baldwin, J., dissenting) (quoting In
re Laverne, 356 F.2d 1003, 1006 (C.C.P.A. 1966)).
34. Wald, supra note 20, at 576; see 8 CHISUM, supra note 18, § 23.01; see also Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989); but cf. Best Lock Corp. v.
Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Newman, J., dissenting).
35. MPEP, supra note 18, § 1504.01(c); see Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 148; see also
Metrokane, Inc. v. Wine Enthusiast, 185 F. Supp. 2d 321, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“The design
patent laws were established to encourage the decorative arts by providing temporally limited
protection for meritorious ornamental designs.”).
36. See Sports Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman Co., 820 F.3d 1316, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(“[A] design patent cannot claim a purely functional design—a design patent is invalid if its
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differently, while function may influence the elements of a particular
design, a design that is compelled purely by functional considerations is
not protectable, as it falls beyond the limited scope of design patent
law.37 Thus, where the claimed design’s exclusive “points of novelty or
nonobviousness over [the] prior [art] are dictated [only] by functional
improvement or alteration,” the design is not subject to patentability.38
There are two primary justifications for employing the rule on
functionality in the design patent context:
First, where function dictates the configuration, there has been no
ornamental creativity. Thus, the purpose of the design patent law to
foster the “decorative arts” is not served by extending a monopoly
on the design. Second, allowance of a design patent may grant in
effect a monopoly on functional features that do[] not meet the
normal requirements for a utility patent on a product or process. 39

Importantly, because the ornamentality requirement, codified in Section
171(a) of the Patent Act, mandates that, for a design to be patentable, its
appearance, taken as a whole, must be primarily ornamental,40 only those
designs that are not “essential to the use of an article” are subject to
design patent protection.41 A claimed design is deemed “essential to the
use of an article when . . . [it] is ‘dictated by’ the use or purpose of the
article.”42 Accordingly, to effectively determine whether the overall
appearance of a particular design is primarily functional or primarily
ornamental, the claimed design must be examined in its entirety, “for the
ultimate question is not the functional or decorative aspect of each
separate feature, but the overall appearance of the article, in determining
whether the claimed design is dictated by the utilitarian purpose of the
article.”43
A design will generally satisfy the statutory requirement of
ornamentality unless: (1) the design is the only configuration that is fit
to perform the particular purpose of the useful article,44 i.e., “there are
overall appearance is ‘dictated by’ its function.” (citing Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.,
543 F.3d 665, 668 (Fed. Cir. 2008))).
37. Id.
38. 8 CHISUM, supra note 18, § 23.03(4) (“A design need not meet the requirement of
utility and indeed will not be patentable if its form is dictated solely by considerations of
function.”).
39. Id. (internal footnote omitted).
40. See MPEP, supra note 18, § 1504.01(c); see also LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 58;
see also 8 CHISUM, supra note 18, § 23.03(2).
41. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
42. Id.
43. L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
44. See Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

608

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:62

no alternative designs with ‘the same or similar functional capabilities,’
or (2) the design is concealed during the entire lifetime of the completed
product.”45 However, because there is “almost always [an] alternative
design[] available,” and because virtually “every part of every product
is visible to someone at some point during the product’s lifecycle,” these
conditions for invalidity seldom materialize.46
B. Definition of a Design
The claimed subject matter of a patentable design is limited to the
visual qualities and ornamental characteristics embodied in or applied to
a particular “article of manufacture.”47 “Design is inseparable from the
article to which it is applied and cannot exist alone merely as a scheme
of surface ornamentation.”48 Thus, to achieve patentability, the claimed
design “must be a definite, preconceived thing, capable of reproduction
and not merely the chance result of a method.”49
C. Definition of the “Article of Manufacture”
While a design patent claims the aesthetic appearance and
ornamental design of an “article of manufacture,”50 the patent protection
afforded to such a claimed design extends only insofar as that design is
applied to or embodied in an the “article of manufacture.”51 Therefore,
whereas “[a] picture standing alone is not patentable under . . . [Section]
171” of the Patent Act, a design that is applied to or embodied in an
“article of manufacture” may be awarded protection.52 This qualifying
language of application or embodiment thus “distinguishes statutory
design subject matter from mere picture or ornamentation, per se (i.e.,

45. Burstein, supra note 8, at 7 (internal footnote omitted) (“These conditions rarely
occur. . . . Therefore, the USPTO regularly grants . . . design patents for designs that are
valuable solely for their utilitarian (as opposed to aesthetic) characteristics and for designs
that are not intended to be seen by their end users.” (internal footnote omitted)).
46. Id.
47. See LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 46; see also MPEP, supra note 18, § 1502.
48. MPEP, supra note 18, § 1502; see Quinn, supra note 19 (“A protectable design
consists of the visual ornamental characteristics embodied in, or applied to, an article of
manufacture. . . . A design for surface ornamentation is inseparable from the article to which
it is applied and cannot exist alone. It must be a definite pattern of surface ornamentation,
applied to an article of manufacture.”).
49. MPEP, supra note 18, § 1502.
50. See LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 58 (“Design patents claim the appearance of an
‘article of manufacture.’ Unlike utility patents which cover the mechanical structures and
functions of articles, design patents protect the visual look of an article.”).
51. See 8 CHISUM, supra note 18, § 23.03(2); see also MPEP, supra note 18, § 1504.01.
52. MPEP, supra note 18, § 1504.01.
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abstract design).”53 That is, to achieve patentability under Section 171
of the Patent Act, “the design must be shown as applied to or embodied
in an article of manufacture”; otherwise, if the claim fails to demonstrate
the design’s application to or embodiment in an “article of manufacture,”
it must be rejected as directed to non-statutory subject matter.54
Accordingly, understanding what the phrase “article of manufacture”
means is fundamental to determining how design patentable subject
matter is defined. A comprehensive analysis discussing the scope of the
term “article of manufacture” is considered in further detail below.55
D. Design Patent Specification and Claim
A design patent covers the specific design of an “article of
manufacture,” as disclosed in the patented claims, “which invariably
refer[s] to the appearance of what is illustrated in the patent’s
drawings”;56 that is, design patents cannot claim general concepts or
ideas.57 Accordingly, because full disclosure and definiteness of scope
are achieved principally through drawings in a design patent application,
pictorial depictions of the claimed design are fundamental to
determining patentability.58
While a design patent must be limited to a single claim, “that claim
can refer to figures illustrating multiple embodiments.”59 Additionally,
where the asserted design comprises both functional and non-functional
features, “the scope of the claim must be construed in order to identify
the non-functional aspects of the design as shown in the patent.”60
“Therefore, because the scope of a patented design must always be
limited to the design’s overall ornamental representation, as opposed to

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See discussion infra Part III.
56. Hoop v. Hoop, 279 F.3d 1004, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Lourie, J., dissenting); see LEE
ET AL., supra note 18, at 49 (“The scope of design patents is determined by the claim, which
in turn, references the figures.”). Within the legal framework of design patent law, the
utilization of drawings in a design patent application is equivalent to the written descriptions
of an invention in a claim for a utility patent. See In re Owens, 710 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
57. See 8 CHISUM, supra note 18, § 23.03(7); see also LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 46.
58. See 8 CHISUM, supra note 18, § 23.01; see also LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 49.
59. LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 51; see 8 CHISUM, supra note 18, § 23.04(1).
60. OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(“[T]he[] functional characteristics [of a design] do not invalidate the design patent, but
merely limit the scope of the protected subject matter.”).
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broader general design conceptions, a proper interpretation of a
patentee’s claimed design centers on the visual impression it creates.”61
1. Solid Lines vs. Broken Lines
The ornamental features of a claimed design are expressed through
the depiction of solid lines in a drawing.62 Inversely, those features in
the drawings of a design patent application that do not wish to be claimed
are represented through the depiction of broken lines.63 Broken lines are
incorporated into a drawing for exclusively illustrative purposes, as they
can furnish the context or environment for the claimed design.64 More
precisely, broken lines may be used to depict “[s]tructure[s] that [are]
not part of the claimed design, but [that are] considered necessary to
show the environment in which the design is associated”—i.e., “any
portion of an article in which the design is embodied, or applied to, that
is not considered part of the claimed design.”65
E. Design Patent Infringement
A design patent is impermissibly infringed and subject to legal
compensation when a party, acting without proper authority and/or
permission, makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented design
during the effective lifetime of the patent therefor.66 More precisely,
“[w]hether a design patent is infringed is determined by first construing
the claim to the design, when appropriate, and then comparing it to the
design of the accused device.”67 Thus, when contemplating a finding of
design patent infringement, the threshold question is whether the
accused article falls within the scope of the patented claim.68 Most
fundamental to this determination is an essential inquiry into the views
of an ordinary observer—that is, whether,

61. Wald, supra note 20, at 579 (citing Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100,
104 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
62. See LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 49; see also MPEP, supra note 18, § 1503.02 (“The
ornamental design which is being claimed must be shown in solid lines in the drawing.”).
63. See LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 50 (“The basic rule is that [broken] lines are not
part of the claimed design.”).
64. See id.
65. MPEP, supra note 18, § 1503.02 (“The two most common uses of broken lines are
to disclose the environment related to the claimed design and to define the bounds of the
claim.”).
66. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
67. OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see
Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
68. See LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 107.
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in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a
purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if
the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him
to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is
infringed by the other.69

Moreover, because design patent infringement is a question of fact, the
patent owner, bearing the burden of proof, must demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that the alleged infringement has
occurred.70
Accordingly, “[t]he comparison step of the infringement analysis
requires the fact-finder to determine whether the patented design as a
whole is substantially similar in appearance to the accused design.”71
However, to support a finding of infringement, these two designs need
not be identical;72 minor differences between the patented design and the
accused design “cannot, and shall not, prevent a finding of
infringement.”73 Additionally, because the availability of patent
protection is limited exclusively to the novel, ornamental features of a
design, only the non-functional aspects of the patented design are
germane to determinations of infringement.74 Thus, “[i]f . . . a design
contains both functional and ornamental features, the patentee must
show that the perceived similarity is based on the ornamental features of
the design.”75 That is, “[t]he patentee ‘must establish that an ordinary

69. Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1872); see 8 CHISUM, supra note 18, § 23.01
(“An article infringes if it so resembles the patented design as to deceive the ordinary observer
who gives such attention as a purchaser usually gives.”).
70. See OddzOn Prods., Inc., 122 F.3d at 1405.
71. Id. (“It is the appearance of a design as a whole which is controlling in determining
infringement.”); see LEE ET AL., supra note 18, at 107 (explaining that the ordinary observer
test “focuses on the overall ornamental appearance of the claimed design, not [individual]
ornamental features”); see also Gorham Co., 81 U.S. at 525-26 (“A patent for a product is a
distinct thing from a patent for the elements entering into it, or for the ingredients of which it
is composed, or for the combination that causes it.”).
72. See OddzOn Prods., Inc., 122 F.3d at 1405 (“The patented and accused designs do
not have to be identical in order for design patent infringement to be found.”); see also Braun
Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 820 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
73. Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
74. See OddzOn Prods., Inc., 122 F.3d at 1405; see also Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.,
838 F.2d 1186, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
75. OddzOn Prods., Inc., 122 F.3d at 1405; see Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien,
Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“After the functional aspects of the claimed
designs are properly excluded from the infringement analysis, [the patentee must show that]
the claimed ornamental designs are . . . [similar to] the ornamental design[s] of . . . [the]
accused products.”).
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person would be deceived by reason of the common features in the
claimed and accused designs which are ornamental.’ ” 76
“[T]he ‘ordinary observer’ analysis is not limited to those features
visible at the point of sale, but instead must encompass all ornamental
features visible at any time during normal use of the product.”77 Within
the framework of design patent law, the term “normal use” has been
construed to comprise “a period in the article’s life, beginning after
completion of manufacture or assembly and ending with the ultimate
destruction, loss, or disappearance of the article.”78 Put differently, “the
‘ordinary observer’ analysis is not limited to those features visible during
only one phase or portion of the normal use lifetime of an accused
product. Instead, the comparison must extend to all ornamental features
visible during normal use of the product . . . .”79
E. Remedies for Design Patent Infringement
Where a valid design patent has been statutorily infringed, and the
patent owner thereof is entitled to compensatory relief, an award of
monetary damages, in the form of either lost profits or reasonable
royalties and attorney fees, is certified under Sections 284 and 285 of the
Patent Act,80 which are supplemented by a special “total profits” remedy
in Section 289.81 Alternatively, under Section 283 of the Patent Act, a
design patentee may be granted injunctive relief, “in accordance with the
principles of equity[,] to prevent the [further] violation of any right
secured by [design] patent, on such terms as the court deems
reasonable,” upon a finding of infringement.82 However, for specific
acts of design patent infringement, the patentee also has available an
76. OddzOn Prods., Inc., 122 F.3d at 1405 (quoting Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d
816, 825 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
77. Contessa Food Prods., Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., 282 F.3d 1370, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
78. Id. at 1379 (quoting In re Webb, 916 F.2d 1553, 1557-58 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
79. Id. at 1380 (internal citation omitted).
80. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 284-285 (announcing the statutory requirements for awards of
enhanced damages and attorney fees, respectively, in a patent infringement action); see also
8 CHISUM, supra note 18, § 23.05(1); see also Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 496 F.
Supp. 476, 498 (D. Minn. 1980).
81. See 35 U.S.C. § 289; see also 8 CHISUM, supra note 18, § 23.05(1); see also Catalina
Lighting, Inc. v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 295 F.3d 1277, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“A design patentee
may recover damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 or under 35 U.S.C. § 289 . . . .”); see also
Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d 1166, 1171 (6th Cir. 1980).
82. 35 U.S.C. § 283; see Sarah Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” Today, 31 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 781, 788 (2018), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/assets/articlePDFs/v31/TheArticle-of-Manufacture-Today-Sarah-Burstein.pdf [https://perma.cc/N66E-S4JD]; see also
Bergstrom, 496 F. Supp. at 498 (holding that “the plaintiff [was] entitled to injunctive relief
under 35 U.S.C. § 283 to prevent further infringement”).
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“additional remedy,” codified in Section 289, whereby the
indemnification sought comprises the equitable disgorgement of
profits—i.e., a measure of damages that compensates for the recovery of
the infringer’s total profits earned.83 Importantly, where only a single
act of design patent infringement is concerned, recovery will be
restricted to damages under either Section 284 or Section 289; however,
under no circumstances is a design patent owner permitted to secure
remedial compensation under both damages provisions.84 Moreover,
while a court, acting within the statutory framework of Section 284, may
authorize, to the design patent owner, an award of treble damages upon
a finding of patent infringement, such autonomy is not afforded under
Section 289.85 Finally, if the sum of damages recoverable under Section
284 exceeds those available under Section 289, the court, in assigning
the appropriate grant of damages for design patent infringement, will
favor the superior damages award afforded under Section 284.86
1. Section 289 of the Patent Act
Section 289 of the Patent Act provides:
Whoever during the term of a patent for a design, without license of
the owner, (1) applies the patented design, or any colorable imitation
83. See 35 U.S.C. § 289; see also Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 580 U.S. 53, 58-59
(2016); see also John G. Froemming et al., U.S. Supreme Court Creates Test for Assessing
Damages for Design Patent Infringement, JONES DAY: INSIGHTS (Dec. 2016),
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2016/12/us-supreme-court-creates-test-for-assessingdamages-for-design-patent-infringement [https://perma.cc/U2KG-FN7G] (“Section 289
creates a special form of damages for infringement of design patents, whereby a patent owner
may elect to pursue ‘total profits’ . . . as an alternative to the traditional patent damages
available under Section 284, such as reasonable royalty. ‘Total profits’ damages are calculated
using the infringer’s total sales and subtracting appropriate costs and expenses.”).
84. See Burstein, supra note 82, at 788-89; see also Catalina Lighting, Inc., 295 F.3d at
1291 (“When only a design patent is at issue, a patentee may not recover both infringer profits
and additional damages under [Section] 284.”).
85. See Burstein, supra note 82, at 789; see also Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am.,
975 F.2d 815, 824 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[Section] 284 . . . provides that a patentee may recover
‘damages adequate to compensate for the infringement’ which ‘the court may increase . . . up
to three times.’ Nothing in . . . [Section] 289 authorizes an increase in a patentee’s total profit.”
(alteration in original)).
86. See Burstein, supra note 82, at 789 n.43. Where a design patent owner seeks to
recover damages under Section 289 of the Patent Act, the jury, in reaching an appropriate
remedy, must first determine what damages would be available to the patentee under both
Section 284 and Section 289. See Nordock, Inc. v. Sys. Inc., 803 F.3d 1344, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2015), vacated, 580 U.S. 1028 (2016). Following its engagement in this comparative
examination, the jury will then grant the patent owner an award of damages in whichever
amount is greater. Id. (“Only where [Section] 289 damages are not sought, or are less than
would be recoverable under [Section] 284, is an award of [Section] 284 damages
appropriate.”).
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thereof, to any article of manufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2)
sells or exposes for sale any article of manufacture to which such
design or colorable imitation has been applied shall be liable to the
owner to the extent of his total profit, but not less than $250,
recoverable in any United States district court having jurisdiction of
the parties.
Nothing in this section shall prevent, lessen, or impeach any other
remedy which an owner of an infringed patent has under the
provisions of this title, but he shall not twice recover the profit made
from the infringement.87

This “total profits” remedy is limited exclusively to matters concerning
design patent infringement.88 Notably, Congress first enacted this
special design patent-specific damages provision, in substantially similar
form, in 1887,89 following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in the
Dobson cases, a series of design patent infringement actions involving
the designs of carpets.90 In Dobson v. Hartford Carpet Co., “the lower
courts had awarded the holders of design patents on carpets damages in
the amount of ‘the entire profit to the [patent holders], per yard, in the
manufacture and sale of carpets of the patented designs, and not merely
the value which the designs contributed to the carpets.’ ” 91 However,
the Supreme Court subsequently reversed this holding, construing “the
statute [in effect at the time] to require proof that the profits were”
attributable to the use of the infringing designs.92 Thus, the Court held
that, “because the patentees could not show what portion of their losses
or the infringers’ profits was due to the patented design and what portion
was due to the unpatented carpet,”93 each plaintiff was only entitled to
an award of nominal damages.94

87. 35 U.S.C. § 289.
88. See Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 55.
89. See generally Burstein, supra note 8, at 53-61. “Although this language differs
somewhat from the language of the 1887 Act, it does not appear that Congress meant to
materially change the meaning of the remedy provision.” Id. at 15 n.87.
90. See Dobson v. Hartford Carpet Co., 114 U.S. 439 (1885); see also Dobson v. Dornan,
118 U.S. 10 (1886). “The cases involved the Dobson brothers, who were found to have
infringed patented designs for carpets.” Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437,
1441 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
91. Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 56 (alteration in original) (quoting Hartford Carpet
Co., 114 U.S. at 443).
92. Id. at 433; see Hartford Carpet Co., 114 U.S. at 444; see also Dornan, 118 U.S. at
17 (“The plaintiff must show what profits or damages are attributable to the use of the
infringing design.”).
93. Nike, Inc., 138 F.3d at 1441.
94. See Dornan, 118 U.S. at 18; see also Hartford Carpet Co., 114 U.S. at 447.
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Accordingly, in 1887, Congress, “concerned that the Dobson cases
weakened design patent law to the point of ‘provid[ing] no effectual
money recovery for infringement,’ ” swiftly “enacted the predecessor to
[Section] 289, which eliminated the ‘need to apportion the infringer’s
profits between the patented design and the article bearing the
design.’ ” 95 Rather than “requiring proof that profits were attributable to
the patented design,” the 1887 predecessor to the special remedies
provision “allowed the patentee to recover ‘the total profit’ made by the
infringer from the ‘manufacture or sale . . . of the article or articles to
which the design, or colorable imitation thereof, has been applied.’ ” 96
The Patent Act of 1952 later “codified that ‘total profit’ remedy for
design patent infringement in [Section] 289”97 and thus solidified the
precedent proscribing the apportionment of design patent damages under
Section 289 of the Patent Act.98
III. THE “ARTICLE OF MANUFACTURE” TODAY: SAMSUNG
ELECTRONICS CO. V. APPLE INC.
A. Background
1. The Design Patent and Trial Proceedings
In 2007, Apple, anticipating the release of its first-generation
iPhone, “took important [legal] measures to . . . protect its modern
smartphone’s unparalleled exterior design [and revolutionary
appearance] from future competitors,” securing a multitude of design
patents in the device’s many ornamental features.99 However, of the
several design patents acquired by Apple, only three are pertinent to the
discussion presented herein. These design patents include: (1) the
D618,677 patent (the “D’677 patent”),100 “which covers a black
95. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
177199, at *52 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2017) (first quoting H.R. REP. NO. 49-1966, at 1 (1886);
then quoting Nike, Inc., 138 F.3d at 1441-42); see Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 56 (“In
1887, in response to the Dobson cases, Congress enacted a specific damages remedy for
design patent infringement.”).
96. Apple Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177199, at *52 (quoting Samsung Elecs. Co., 580
U.S. at 57).
97. Id. at *52-53.
98. See Nike, Inc., 138 F.3d at 1441-43.
99. Wald, supra note 20, at 571 (citing Sam Oliver, Apple wins patent for first iPhone,
designed by Jobs & Ive, APPLEINSIDER (Dec. 18, 2012, 12:12 PM), https://appleinsider.com/
articles/12/12/18/apple-wins-patent-for-first-iphone-designed-by-jobs-ive [https://perma.cc/
CN4C-5ME8]); see Apple Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177199, at *53.
100. The D’677 patent discloses a single embodiment that focuses on the front face design
elements of the Apple iPhone:
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rectangular front face of a phone with rounded corners;”101 (2) the
D593,087 patent (the “D’087 patent”),102 “which covers a rectangular
front face of a phone with rounded corners and a raised rim;”103 and (3)

U.S. Patent No. D618,677 figs.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8 (filed Nov. 18, 2008).
101. Apple Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177199, at *53.
102. The D’087 patent discloses six distinct design features, all directed at the front face
of the device, that extend to the outer bezel of the iPhone:

U.S. Patent No. D593,087 figs.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,
20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44,
45, 46, 47 & 48 (filed July 30, 2007).
103. Apple Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177199, at *53.
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the D604,305 patent (the “D’305 patent”),104 “which covers a grid of
[sixteen] colorful icons on a black screen.”105
Unsurprisingly, the original “iPhone inspired a generation of
copycats, setting in motion the widespread adoption of devices that
mirrored the [unprecedented] smartphone’s attractive appearance and
innovative capabilities.”106 In particular, following Apple’s debut of the
first-generation iPhone, Samsung Electronics, a competing manufacturer
of smartphones and electronic devices, released a series of remarkably
similar smartphones that greatly resembled the early Apple device.107
Accordingly, on April 15, 2011, Apple initiated a lawsuit against
Samsung, asserting, insofar as germane here, that various Samsung
smartphones infringed Apple’s D’677, D’087, and D’305 design
patents.108 A thirteen-day jury trial ensued, and, after approximately
three full days of deliberation, a nine-person jury reached a verdict of
design patent infringement in favor of Apple and against Samsung,
finding that several of Samsung’s devices had indeed infringed on the
three patented designs.109
Consistent with this infringement
determination, the jury then awarded Apple damages in an amount
104. Id. The D’305 patent claims “the ornamental design for a graphical user interface for
a display screen or portion thereof” as shown in the following drawing:

U.S. Patent No. D604,305 figs.1 & 2 (filed June 23, 2007).
105. Apple Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177199, at *53.
106. Wald, supra note 20, at 570-71 (first citing The impact of the iPhone, 10 years on,
NATIONAL: OPINION (June 30, 2017), https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/the-impact-of-theiphone-10-years-on-1.1510 [https://perma.cc/6H3M-2RBC] (“Companies like Samsung rose
on the back of [Apple’s] products . . . .”); then citing Lisa Eadicicco, This Is Why the iPhone
Upended the Tech Industry, TIME: TECH (June 29, 2017), http://time.com/4837176/iphone10th-anniversary/ [https://perma.cc/JR65-LQRR] (“Google . . . rebuilt its first Android phone
from the ground up after Apple’s keynote.”)).
107. See Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 580 U.S. 53, 57 (2016).
108. Id. at 57-58.
109. Apple Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177199, at *59.
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equaling the total profits earned by Samsung from the sale of its
infringing smartphones.110
Following this finding of infringement, Samsung engaged in
subsequent post-trial motions practice and, on the theory that Apple’s
“design patent infringement damages numbers relied on improper notice
dates,” successfully moved for judgment as a matter of law.111
Specifically, because Apple had failed to present sufficient evidence
necessary “to recalculate the appropriate damages award for some of the
infringing sales at issue in light of the proper notice dates,” the court
curtailed the original jury award and “ordered a limited new trial on
utility and design patent damages relating only to the sales of those
products.”112 On November 13, 2013, a six-day retrial commenced, and,
after two days of deliberation, a jury granted Apple a reduced damages
award, less approximately $120 million, to remedy Samsung’s design
and utility patent infringement.113 Finally, on March 6, 2014, after the
filing, and subsequent rejection, of an additional post-trial motion by
Samsung, the court entered a final judgment in favor of Apple.114
2. Appeal of the Final Judgment
Upholding the jury verdict on appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the damages award for design
patent infringement, the amount of which paralleled “the entire profit
Samsung made from its sales of the infringing smartphones.”115 In so
doing, the Federal Circuit rejected Samsung’s argument that “the district
court legally erred in allowing the jury to award [its] entire profits on its
infringing smartphones as damages,” and repudiated the two theories
advanced by Samsung to support its contention “that design patent

110. Id.
111. Id. at *60.
112. Id. at *61.
113. Id. at *63 (“The [c]ourt specified . . . that ‘[t]he [c]ourt’s prior rulings on the parties’
Daubert motions, motions in limine, discovery disputes, and evidentiary objections [from the
original trial would] remain in effect as law of the case. The parties [could] not relitigate these
issues. Thus, the Court limited the evidence and witnesses at the 2013 trial to the evidence
that was admissible at the 2012 trial.” (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted)).
114. Id.
115. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 580 U.S. 53, 58 (2016). The Federal Circuit,
“agree[ing] with the district court that there was no legal error in the jury instruction on the
design patent damages. . . , affirm[ed] the damages awarded [to Apple] for design patent
infringements.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2015), rev’d,
137 S. Ct. 429 (2016).
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damages should have been less than [its] ‘entire profits on its infringing
smartphones.’ ” 116
“First, Samsung argued that ‘[t]he damages . . . should have been
limited to the profit attributable to the infringement’ and that ‘consumers
chose Samsung [products] based on a host of other factors [besides the
infringed designs].’ ” 117 In evaluating this theory, the Federal Circuit
held that, because “Section 289 explicitly authorizes the award of total
profit from the article of manufacture bearing the patented design,” the
acceptance of any “causation” argument, including that urged by
Samsung, would directly contravene the clear statutory language
forbidding the adoption of such a rule.118 More precisely, the Federal
Circuit explained that this theory, which would fundamentally “require[]
[the patentee] to show what portion of the infringer’s profit, or of his
own lost profit, was due to the design and what portion was due to the
article itself,”119 must be rejected under Section 289 of the Patent Act, as
it would inappropriately “advocate [for] the same ‘apportionment’
requirement that Congress rejected” for design patent infringement
damages under the special remedies provision.120
“Second, Samsung argued that ‘the profits awarded [for design
patent infringement] should have been limited to the infringing “article
of manufacture,” not the entire infringing product’ ” 121—i.e., “to the
portion of the product as sold that incorporates or embodies the subject
matter of the patent.”122 Relying on Bush & Lane Piano Co. v. Becker
Bros. (“Piano I”),123 and Bush & Lane Piano Co. v. Becker Bros. (“Piano
II”)124 (collectively, “the Piano cases”), Samsung maintained that,
because the Second Circuit, in those cases, “allowed an award of
infringer’s profits from the patented design of a piano case but not from
the sale of the entire piano,” the district court, in this case, was similarly
116. Apple Inc., 786 F.3d at 1001-02; see Apple Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177199, at
*63 (citing Apple Inc., 786 F.3d at 1001-02) (“The Federal Circuit held that both theories
lacked merit.”).
117. Apple Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177199, at *63 (alterations in original) (quoting
Apple Inc., 786 F.3d at 1001).
118. Apple Inc., 786 F.3d at 1001-02.
119. Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
120. Apple Inc., 786 F.3d at 1001 (“The Act of 1887, specific to design patents, removed
the apportionment requirement . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting Nike, Inc., 138 F.3d at
1441)).
121. Apple Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177199, at *64 (quoting Apple Inc., 786 F.3d at
1002).
122. Apple Inc., 786 F.3d at 1002.
123. Bush & Lane Piano Co. v. Becker Bros., 222 F. 902 (2d Cir. 1915).
124. Bush & Lane Piano Co. v. Becker Bros., 234 F. 79 (2d Cir. 1916) (opinion after
appeal following remand).
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obligated to limit the damages awarded for design patent
infringement.125 However, the Federal Circuit belied this contention,
finding the factual underpinnings of those Second Circuit opinions—i.e.,
a factual situation where “[a] purchaser desiring a piano of a particular
manufacturer [was capable of] hav[ing] the piano placed in any one of
several cases dealt in by the maker”126—to be inherently different from
the circumstances existing in the present case.127 Put differently, because
“[t]he innards of Samsung’s smartphones were not sold separately from
their shells as distinct articles of manufacture to ordinary purchasers,”
the Federal Circuit rejected this theory for being without merit.128
Instead, the Federal Circuit held that “the design patent damages did not
need to be limited to profits attributable to an article of manufacture less
than the entirety of each infringing Samsung phone.”129
3. Proceedings Before the United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case.130
“The question for which certiorari was granted was: ‘Where a design
patent is applied to only a component of a product, should an award of
infringer’s profits be limited to those profits attributable to the
component?’ ” 131 The Court held that, because “Section 289 allows a
patent holder to recover the total profit an infringer makes from the
infringement,” and because
‘ [t]otal’ . . . means all[,] [t]he ‘total profit’ for which [Section] 289
makes an infringer liable is thus all of the profit made from the
prohibited conduct, that is, from the manufacture or sale of the

125. Apple Inc., 786 F.3d at 1002. In the Piano cases, “the Second Circuit held that the
patentee had been overcompensated for being awarded the profits from an entire piano when
the design patent at issue only applied to the piano case, not the internal components of the
piano itself.” Apple Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177199, at *56.
126. Bush & Lane Piano Co., 222 F. at 903. “That factual situation occurred in the context
of the commercial practice in 1915 in which ordinary purchasers regarded a piano and a piano
case as distinct articles of manufacture.” Apple Inc., 786 F.3d at 1002.
127. See Apple Inc., 786 F.3d at 1002.
128. Id.
129. Apple Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177199, at *64. “[T]he Federal Circuit identified
the entire smartphone as the only permissible ‘article of manufacture’ for the purpose of
calculating [Section] 289 damages because consumers could not separately purchase
components of the smartphones.” Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 580 U.S. 53, 55 (2016).
130. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 577 U.S. 1215 (2016) (granting certiorari).
131. Apple Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177199, at *65-66 (“At oral argument . . . ,
Samsung abandoned its apportionment argument, and thus interpretation of the term ‘article
of manufacture’ was the only issue before the U.S. Supreme Court.”).
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‘article of manufacture to which [the patented] design or colorable
imitation has been applied.’ 132

Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that “[a]rriving at a damages
award under [Section] 289 . . . involves two steps[:] First, identify the
‘article of manufacture’ to which the infringed design has been applied.
Second, calculate the infringer’s total profit made on that article of
manufacture.”133
On the first step, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that, because
“[t]he term ‘article of manufacture,’ as used in [Section] 289 [of the
Patent Act], encompasses both a product sold to a consumer and a
component of that product,” the statutory text resolved this case.134
More specifically, the Court held that “the ‘article of manufacture’ for
which total profits are awarded under [Section] 289 was not necessarily
limited to the product that is sold to consumers, but may be either ‘a
product sold to a consumer [or] a component of that product.’ ” 135
However, while the Court concluded that, “[i]n the case of a
multicomponent product, the relevant ‘article of manufacture’ for
arriving at a [Section] 289 damages award need not be the end product
sold to the consumer but may be only a component of that product,”136 it
declined to “resolve whether, for each of the design patents at issue [in
Samsung], the relevant article of manufacture [was] the smartphone, or
a particular smartphone component.”137 Nor did the U.S. Supreme Court
agree to establish a test for identifying the relevant “article of
manufacture” at the first step of the Section 289 damages inquiry;138

132. Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 59 (first quoting Total, AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY
ENG. LANGUAGE, https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=total&submit.x=0&submit.y
=0 [https://perma.cc/5UE8-GUAP]; then quoting 35 U.S.C. § 289); see Total, BALLENTINE’S
LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969) (“The whole amount; the entire quantity.”).
133. Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 59.
134. Id.
135. Apple Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177199, at *66 (alteration in original) (quoting
Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 59).
136. Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 53.
137. Id. at 62 (“Doing so would require [the Court] to set out a test for identifying the
relevant article of manufacture at the first step of the [Section] 289 damages inquiry and to
parse the record to apply that test in this case.”).
138. Id. (“The United States as amicus curiae suggested a test but Samsung and Apple did
not brief the issue. [Thus, the Court] decline[d] to lay out a test for the first step of the [Section]
289 damages inquiry in the absence of adequate briefing by the parties.” (internal citation
omitted)); see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 2729, Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 580 U.S. 53 (2016) (No. 15-777).
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doing so, the Court reasoned, was “not necessary to resolve the question
presented in this case.”139
a. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Reading of the Term “Article of
Manufacture” in Section 289 of the Patent Act
The threshold matter presented in this case and, consequently,
addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court is “the scope of the term ‘article
of manufacture’ ” ; that is, “whether, in the case of a multicomponent
product, the relevant ‘article of manufacture’ must always be the end
product sold to the consumer or whether it can also be a component of
that product.”140 The Court purported to resolve this question by fixating
on the meaning of the term “article of manufacture” within the textual
framework and statutory language of Section 289.141 More specifically,
relying almost exclusively on the statutory term’s dictionary definition,
the Supreme Court held that, because “[a]n ‘article’ is just ‘a particular
thing,’ ” 142 and because “ ‘ manufacture’ means ‘the conversion of raw
materials by the hand, or by machinery, into articles suitable for the use
of man’ and ‘the articles so made,’ ” 143 an “article of manufacture” is
“simply a thing made by hand or machine.”144
139. Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 62. The epic seven-year battle between Apple and
Samsung over the three iPhone design patents ended in May 2018 when the parties settled the
case. Gene Quinn, What Mattered in 2018: Industry Insiders Reflect on the Biggest Moments
in IP, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 30, 2018, 11:35 AM), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/12/
30/2018-biggest-moments-ip/id=104351/ [https://perma.cc/Y9E4-PWYD]. After many twists
and turns, Apple was ultimately awarded $539,000,000 in damages for Samsung’s design
patent infringement. Id.
140. Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 59 (“Under the former interpretation, a patent holder
will always be entitled to the infringer’s total profit from the end product. Under the latter
interpretation, a patent holder will sometimes be entitled to the infringer’s total profit from a
component of the end product.”).
141. See id. (“The text resolves this case.”).
142. Id. (quoting JAMES STORMONTH & PHILIP H. PHELP, A DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 53 (N.Y., Harper & Bros. 1885)) (defining “article” as “a jointed thing
or part; a clause or item; a particular thing”); see Article, AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY ENG.
LANGUAGE, https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=article&submit.x=0&submit.y=0
[https://perma.cc/USZ5-FVZ2] (“An individual thing or element of a class; a particular object
or item . . . .”).
143. Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 60 (quoting STORMONTH & PHELP, supra note 142,
at 589) (defining “manufacture” as “the conversion of raw materials by the hand, or by
machinery, into articles suitable for the use of man”); see Manufacture, AM. HERITAGE
DICTIONARY ENG. LANGUAGE, https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=manufacture&
submit.x=65&submit.y=21 [https://perma.cc/HSL7-CTUN] (“The act, craft, or process of
manufacturing products, especially on a large scale[;] [a] product that is manufactured.”).
144. Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 60. “The opinion rests directly . . . on the idea that,
according to its dictionary definition, an ‘article of manufacture’ is any ‘thing made by hand
or machine.’ ” Ronald J. Mann, Design Patent Damages After Samsung v. Apple, 1
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In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that, “[s]o
understood, the term ‘article of manufacture’ is broad enough to
encompass both a product sold to a consumer [and] a component of that
product.”145 Thus, the Supreme Court rationalized, the inherent capacity
of “[a] component of a product, not less than the product itself,” to “be
integrated into a larger product . . . does not put it outside the category
of articles of manufacture.”146 Put differently, because “the term ‘article
of manufacture’ is broad enough to embrace both a product sold to a
consumer and a component of that product, whether sold separately or
not,” the Court held that Section 289 of the Patent Act could not be
narrowly construed to cover only the end product sold to consumers.147
Instead, it held that, depending on the particular circumstances, statutory
damages may be available at either the component level or the end level
under the Section 289 special remedies provision.148
Moreover, while the Court held that “[t]he Federal Circuit’s
narrower reading of ‘article of manufacture’ [could not] be squared with
the text of [Section] 289,”149 it determined its broad reading of the term
“article of manufacture” in Section 289 to be consistent with both
Section “171(a), which makes ‘new, original and ornamental design[s]
for an article of manufacture’ eligible for design patent protection,”150
and Section “101, which makes ‘any new and useful . . . manufacture . . .
or any new and useful improvement thereof’ eligible for . . . patent
protection.”151 More precisely, reasoning that “the term ‘article of
manufacture’ is broad enough to embrace both a product sold to a
consumer and a component of that product, whether sold separately or
CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 197, 198 (2016), https://www.criterioninnovation.com/articles/
mann-design-patent-damages-after-samsung-v-apple.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4QT-8CQ6].
145. Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 60.
146. See id.
147. Id. at 62.
148. See id.; see also Dennis Crouch, Samsung v. Apple: Design Patent Damages May be
Limited to Components, PATENTLY-O (Dec. 6, 2016), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/12/
samsung-limited-components.html [https://perma.cc/9CPH-ZSBX].
149. Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 61.
150. Id. at 60 (alteration in original) (“The Patent Office and the courts have understood
[Section] 171 to permit a design patent for a design extending to only a component of a
multicomponent product.”); see, e.g., Ex parte Adams, 84 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 310, 311
(1898) (“The several articles of manufacture of peculiar shape which when combined produce
a machine or structure having moveable parts may each separately be patented as a design
. . . .”); see also In re Zahn, 617 F.2d 261, 268 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (“Section 171 authorizes
patents on ornamental designs for articles of manufacture. While the design must be embodied
in some article, the statute is not limited to designs for complete articles, or ‘discrete’ articles,
and certainly not to articles separately sold . . . .”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 171(a).
151. Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 61 (alteration in original); see 35 U.S.C. § 101; see
also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
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not,” the Supreme Court concluded that the Federal Circuit’s “reading
[of] ‘article of manufacture’ in [Section] 289 to cover only an end
product sold to a consumer [gave] too narrow a meaning to the
phrase.”152 Thus, the Court held that “components of the infringing
smartphones could . . . be the relevant article of manufacture” under
Section 289, even though “consumers could not purchase those
components separately from the smartphones.”153
IV. THE “ARTICLE OF MANUFACTURE” IN 1887
A. The Definition of “Article of Manufacture” in 1887
When the United States Congress first enacted the original design
patent disgorgement statute in the 1887 Patent Act—i.e., the predecessor
to the special “total profits” remedy provision codified in Section 289 of
the Patent Act today—the phrase “article of manufacture” was a term of
art that did not simply “refer to any ‘article’ that was
‘manufactured.’ ” 154 Instead, the “article of manufacture” language, so
understood, “referred to a tangible item made by humans—other than a
machine or [a] composition of matter—that had a unitary structure and
was complete in itself for use or for sale.”155 Notably, “[t]o be
‘complete’ in this sense, the item did not have to be the ultimate product
sold or used by the ultimate consumer.”156 This early interpretation of
the term “article of manufacture” has important implications that must
be considered in formulating a more comprehensive framework for
“article of manufacture” identification in Section 289 of the Patent Act.
152. Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 62.
153. Id. at 61; see Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(declining to limit a Section 289 award to a component of the smartphone because “[t]he
innards of Samsung’s smartphones were not sold separately from their shells as distinct
articles of manufacture to ordinary purchasers”), rev’d, 580 U.S. 53 (2016); see also Nordock,
Inc. v. Sys. Inc., 803 F.3d 1344, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2015), vacated, 580 U.S. 1028 (2016)
(declining to limit a Section 289 award to the design for a “lip and hinge plate” because it was
“welded together” with a leveler, and there was no evidence that it was sold “separate[ly] from
the leveler as a complete unit”).
154. Burstein, supra note 8, at 61. See generally Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 105, 24 Stat. 387.
155. Burstein, supra note 8, at 61-62 (“The . . . words ‘article’ and ‘manufacture’ indicate
that an ‘article of manufacture’ had to be both tangible and made by humans. The Patent
Office repeatedly ruled that an article of manufacture had to have a ‘single, unitary structure.’
An article of manufacture also had to be complete in itself for use or for sale. To be ‘complete’
in this sense, the item did not have to be the ultimate product sold or used by the ultimate
consumer.” (internal footnotes omitted)).
156. Id. at 62 (“For example, a mantel was an article of manufacture even though it was
meant to ‘ultimately becom[e] part of a house.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Ex parte
Lewis, 1891 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 61, 63)).
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1. The Legislative History of the Term “Article of Manufacture”
in 1887
The statutory language first utilized in 1887 and currently
employed in the Patent Act’s special damages provision today has
remained fundamentally unchanged.157 Significantly, the genesis of this
legislation arose out of a consolidation of Supreme Court decisions,
entered between 1885 and 1886, to “limit[] a design patent owner to [the]
recovery of ‘only nominal damages,’ for want of evidence apportioning
the value of the design and the value of the article of manufacture itself”
in the Dobson cases.158 These Supreme Court decisions prompted a swift
congressional rejection of the apportionment requirement in design
patent law, thereby forming the statutory precursor for the contemporary
special remedies provision in Section 289 of the Patent Act.159
a. The Carpet Cases
The 1885 Supreme Court decision in Dobson v. Hartford Carpet
Co. “consolidated three suits in equity for design patent infringement
brought against John Dobson and James Dobson by the Hartford Carpet
Co. and Bigelow Carpet Co.”160 In each of the respective “Carpet
Cases,” John and James Dobson were accused of infringing design
patents for the surface ornamentation of carpet designs.161
Notwithstanding the fact that the Dobson brothers were quickly found
liable for “nicking” the designs from the opposing carpet makers and
advertising them as their own,162 the Court grappled with the question of
damages;163 that is, “the judges [could not] determine precisely how
valuable [the] design was when compared with everything else that goes

157. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in
Support of Respondent at 6, Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 580 U.S. 53 (2016) (No. 15777), https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/15-777-amicus-resp-AIPLA
.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5QL-TYKK].
158. Id. (first citing Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10 (1886); then citing Dobson v. Hartford
Carpet Co., 114 U.S. 439 (1885)).
159. See id.
160. Id. at 10; see Hartford Carpet Co., 114 U.S. at 440. Collectively, these cases became
known as the “Carpet Cases.”
161. See generally Hartford Carpet Co., 114 U.S. 439.
162. See Dave Lee, Apple and Samsung reach Supreme Court in patent row, BBC: NEWS
(Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-37614014 [https://perma.cc/XVT59C8T].
163. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Industrial Designers Society of America in Support of
Neither Party at 9, Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 580 U.S. 53 (2016) (No. 15-777),
https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/15-777-ac-IDSA-supportingneither-party.pdf [https://perma.cc/E874-6PN2].
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into making a nice carpet.”164 While the appellate court ultimately
“awarded the patent holders the profits which they would have made on
the sale of the quantity of carpets sold by the Dobson[] [Brothers],” the
Supreme Court subsequently reversed.165 Instead, finding that the
patentees were incapable of distinguishing the “portion of the infringer’s
profits [that were] attributable to the design” from those that were
attributable to the carpet itself, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the
infringers of [the] patented designs for carpets were liable for only
nominal damages of six cents.”166
Simply put, the “Carpet Cases” exposed the problematic nature of
an apportionment rule in cases of design patent infringement—namely,
by allocating nominal damages as the sole compensatory remedy for
such infringements, these decisions regularly left the design patentee
exposed and without any meaningful form of monetary relief.167 Thus,
in 1887, Congress responded to the Dobson “Carpet Cases” by enacting
remedial legislation, now codified in Section 289, that overturned these
Supreme Court decisions, and which effectively eliminated “the need to
apportion the infringer’s profits between the patented design and the
article bearing the design.”168 Plainly rejecting the continued use of an
apportionment rule as a limitation on an award of profits,169 the
accompanying House Report explained that “[i]t is expedient that the
infringer’s entire profit on the article should be recoverable, as otherwise
none of his profit can be recovered, for it is not apportionable; and . . .
the entire profit on the article should be recoverable . . . , for it is the
164. Lee, supra note 162 (“A lovely design on a poor quality rug [would not] sell . . . .”).
165. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in Support
of Respondent, supra note 157, at 10; see Hartford Carpet Co., 114 U.S. at 445-46 (“The
[apportionment] rule . . . is even more applicable to a patent for a design than to one for
mechanism. A design or pattern in ornamentation or shape appeals only to the taste through
the eye, and is often a matter of evanescent caprice.”); accord Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S.
10, 17-18 (1886) (reversing the award of lost profits to the patentee based on the quality of
the carpets sold by the defendants).
166. Brief of Amicus Curiae Industrial Designers Society of America in Support of
Neither Party, supra note 163, at 9; see Hartford Carpet Co., 114 U.S. at 445-46.
167. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Industrial Designers Society of America in Support of
Neither Party, supra note 163, at 9; see H.R. REP. NO. 49-1966, at 1 (1886) (“It now appears
that the design patent laws provide no effectual money recovery for infringement.”).
168. Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1442 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see H.R.
REP. NO. 49-1966, at 1; see also Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 580 U.S. 53, 56 (2016).
“Congress established Section 289 in 1887 in response to the Carpet Cases, where only
nominal damages were awarded because of the difficulty in proving an apportioned amount.”
Brief of Amicus Curiae Industrial Designers Society of America in Support of Neither Party,
supra note 163, at 11; see, e.g., Dornan, 118 U.S. 10.
169. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in
Support of Respondent, supra note 157, at 11.
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design that sells the article . . . .”170 Similarly, and in relatively
comparable language, the corresponding Senate Report echoed these
findings, emphasizing that any failure to ratify this bill would “virtually
repeal the design patent laws.”171 Therefore, the statutory language
announced in the 1887 Act “constitutes a congressional rejection of a
causation consideration, i.e., an apportionment requirement, and
authorizes [the] recovery of [an] infringer’s total profit from the article
of manufacture bearing the patented design.”172
2. The Supreme Court’s Definition of “Article of Manufacture”
vs. the Definition of “Article of Manufacture” in 1887
Generally, entrenched in the United States’ long-standing history
of statutory interpretation is the fundamental principle that “when
Congress reenacts existing statutory language, it is presumed to
acquiesce in the way the courts have interpreted that language.”173 More
specifically, “it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that, when
Congress employs a term of art, it presumably knows and adopts the
cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of
learning from which it is taken.”174 That is, where the language being
construed constitutes a statutory term of art, “it is the traditional use, not
the plain meaning, that governs.”175 Therefore, guided by these cannons
of construction, considerable weight must be afforded to the 1887
definition of “article of manufacture” in order to evaluate the practical
feasibility of the Supreme Court’s definition for the statutory term of art.
Holding that “[t]he term ‘article of manufacture’ . . . encompasses
both a product sold to a consumer and a component of that product,” the
United States Supreme Court, in Samsung, effectively counseled that
any “end product sold to the consumer” would qualify as an “article of

170. H.R. REP. NO. 49-1966, at 3; see Nike, Inc., 138 F.3d at 1442 (“The difference for
design patents, as enacted in 1887, was the removal of the need to apportion the infringer’s
profits between the patented design and the article bearing the design.”).
171. S. REP. NO. 49-206, at 1 (1886).
172. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in Support
of Respondent, supra note 157, at 6; see Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983,
1002-03 (Fed. Cir. 2015), rev’d, 580 U.S. 53 (2016).
173. Mark A. Lemley, Does “Public Use” Mean the Same Thing It Did Last Year?, 93
TEX. L. REV. 1119, 1126 (2015), http://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/
Lemley-93-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/RUE9-PFAH].
174. Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 571 U.S. 237, 248 (2014) (quoting Fed. Aviation
Admin. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 292 (2012)).
175. Lemley, supra note 173, at 1127.
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manufacture” under Section 289 of that Patent Act.176 However, the
historical evidence surrounding the statutory meaning of the term of art
in 1887 belies this interpretation.177 In 1887, “the phrase ‘article of
manufacture’ was not a synonym for ‘product’ ” ;178 rather, the historical
evidence demonstrates that not every product “sold by an enterprise to
its customers” was considered an “article of manufacture” in 1887.179
Put differently, although an “article of manufacture” had to be a
“product” insofar as “it had to be complete enough to be sold to
someone,” the statutory term, as understood in 1887, did not require that
“that ‘someone’ be the ultimate or end consumer”—i.e., the purchaser
of the “article of manufacture” could have been another manufacturer or
artisan.180 Thus, in 1887, while every “article of manufacture” needed
to be a complete “product” capable of individual sale, “not every ‘end
product sold to the consumer’ qualified as an ‘article of
manufacture.’ ” 181
Moreover, central to the Court’s determination in Samsung was the
fundamental presumption that the term “article of manufacture” in
Section 289 of the Patent Act “is simply a thing made by hand or
machine.”182 However, once again, the historical evidence indicates
that, in 1887, “not all ‘thing[s] made by hand or machine’ were
considered ‘articles of manufacture.’ ” 183 Similarly, contrary to the
Supreme Court’s holding in Samsung that “[t]he term ‘article of
manufacture,’ as used in [Section] 289, encompasses both a product sold
to a consumer and a component of that product,”184 which could “be read
as suggesting that any ‘component’ can be an ‘article of manufacture’

176. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 580 U.S. 53, 59-62 (2016); see Burstein, supra
note 8, at 64.
177. Burstein, supra note 8, at 64.
178. Id.
179. KARL T. ULRICH & STEVEN D. EPPINGER, PRODUCT DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT 2
(5th ed. 2012); see Burstein, supra note 8, at 64. For example, in a case involving a glass
inkstand and a removable stopper, the Patent Office deemed the two elements to be distinct
“articles of manufacture,” albeit both being presumably sold together as a single unitary
product and each being individually useless on its own. Ex parte Brower, 1873 Dec. Comm’r
Pat. 151, 151. Similarly, in a design patent application for a pocket watch, the Patent Office
held that the mirror-frame and adjoining sconce comprised two separate “articles of
manufacture,” despite being seemingly attached to form a single fixture and designed to be
used together. Ex parte Patitz, 1883 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 101, 102.
180. Burstein, supra note 8, at 65.
181. Id. at 66 (citing Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 59).
182. Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 60 (“An article of manufacture, then, is simply a
thing made by hand or machine.”); see Burstein, supra note 8, at 67.
183. Burstein, supra note 8, at 66-67 (alteration in original).
184. Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 59.
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for the purposes of [Section] 289,”185 the 1887 definition of the statutory
term held that, although a component could indeed be an “article of
manufacture,” not all “components” necessarily were “articles of
manufacture.”186 Thus, while it is was true that, under the statutory
language of the 1887 Patent Act, “not all articles of manufacture [were]
complete commercial products, neither [were] all components . . .
considered articles of manufacture.”187
V. COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARABILITY
A. Background
Section 101 of the Copyright Act provides that a “pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural feature[]” incorporated into the “design of a useful article”
is eligible for copyright protection if, and only to the extent that, it (1)
“can be identified separately from,” and (2) is “capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.” 188 A “useful
article,” as defined in this statutory title, “is an article having an intrinsic
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the
article or to convey information.”189 Thus, while copyright protection
cannot preserve the purely utilitarian aspects of a design, it will
nevertheless survive where the asserted work of authorship—comprising
a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature—”is either physically or
‘conceptually’ separable from the utilitarian aspects of the useful
article.”190 Therefore, central to determining the copyrightability of a
useful article—or, stated more aptly, the copyrightability of the pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features comprising that article—is the doctrine of
separability.

185. Burstein, supra note 8, at 67 (citing Michael Risch, Samsung v. Apple: Drilling
Down on Profit Calculations, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Dec. 6, 2016),
https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2016/12/samsung-v-apple-drilling-down-onprofit.html [https://perma.cc/7JZN-P93X]).
186. Id. at 68.
187. McKenna, supra note 8.
188. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 2019).
189. Id.; see Grady Garrison, Copyright protection for designs of useful articles, IAM (Apr.
13, 2016), https://www.iam-media.com/copyright/copyright-protection-designs-usefularticles [https://perma.cc/L3L2-9V3A] (“Under this definition, a lamp is a useful article,
whereas a painting is not.”).
190. Robert W. Clarida, Gimme an “S” for Separability: Supreme Court to Consider
Copyrightability of Designs on Cheerleading Uniforms, LANDSLIDE, Nov./Dec. 2016, at 57,
58.
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1. The Separability Requirement
The doctrine of separability fundamentally “derives from the notion
that an otherwise copyrightable item should not be denied protection
[simply] because it is employed as part of a useful article.”191 Thus,
under the “separability” threshold imposed by the Copyright Act,
copyright protection extends to a useful article only insofar as the
ornamental design elements, reflecting the independent artistic
judgments of the author, are distinct from their mechanical and utilitarian
functions.192 However, where the incorporated features of a useful
article are not separable from the mechanical or utilitarian function of
the article itself, the “[i]nseparable design features, whatever their
aesthetic appeal, are not protected under copyright law.”193 Accordingly,
to determine whether the design features of a useful article are separable
from its utilitarian elements and, therefore, are eligible for copyright
protection, two statutory tests are employed: the physical separability
test and the conceptual separability test.194
a. The Physical Separability Test
A pictorial, graphic, or sculptural “feature is physically separable
from the underlying useful article if it can ‘be physically separated from
the article by ordinary means while leaving the utilitarian aspects of the
article completely intact.’ ” 195 Put differently, the physical separability
test is satisfied when the copyrightable elements—i.e., the incorporated

191. Carl Mazurek, Fashion Copyright and the Muddling of the Useful Articles Doctrine,
JIPEL: THE BLOG (Apr. 11, 2016), https://blog.jipel.law.nyu.edu/2016/04/fashion-copyrightand-the-muddling-of-the-useful-articles-doctrine/ [https://perma.cc/KLL4-NBS9].
192. See Jim Stronski et al., The New Standard for Copyright Protection of Useful
Articles: Star Athletica and its Impact on the 3-D Printing Industry, 94 PAT., TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. 738 (2017).
193. Jane C. Ginsburg, “Courts Have Twisted Themselves into Knots”: U.S. Copyright
Protection for Applied Art, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 2 (2016), https://
scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3001&context=faculty_scholarship
[https://perma.cc/PFM8-848V].
194. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES
§ 924.2 (3d ed. 2014) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM], https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/
compendium-12-22-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4HX-4DXE]. Note that, while the U.S.
Supreme Court, in Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., “necessarily abandon[ed] the
distinction between ‘physical’ and ‘conceptual’ separability,” Star Athletica L.L.C. v. Varsity
Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1014 (2017), to effectively illustrate the statutory background
upon which the proposed legal framework recommended herein is primarily based, see
discussion infra Part VI, for the purpose of this Article, physical and conceptual separability
will be discussed as discrete statutory tests.
195. Star Athletica L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. at 1014 (quoting COMPENDIUM, supra note 194, §
924.2(A)).
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pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features of a useful article—can “be
physically removed without altering the useful aspects of the article.”196
Therefore, because a hood ornament that is physically removed from an
automobile is nevertheless capable of existing independently of that
automobile, and because the purely artistic features of that hood
ornament can be identified separately from the utilitarian functions of
the automobile, “[a] sufficiently creative decorative hood ornament on
an automobile” is copyrightable under the physical separability test.197
b. The Conceptual Separability Test
Alternatively, conceptual separability is determinative of
copyrightability when “a feature of the useful article is clearly
recognizable as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, notwithstanding
the fact that it cannot be physically separated from the article by ordinary
means.”198 Therefore, under the conceptual separability test, even where
an artistic feature is not physically separable from the useful article, it
may be eligible for copyright protection if it is “capable of being
visualized . . . as a work of authorship that is independent from the
overall shape of the useful article.”199 That is, “the feature must be
imagined separately and independently from the useful article without
destroying the basic shape of that article.”200 “A pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural feature satisfies this requirement only if the artistic feature and
the useful article could both exist side by side and be perceived as fully
realized, separate works—one an artistic work and the other a useful
article.”201 For example, under the conceptual separability test, “the
carving on the back of a chair” is copyrightable because “one could
imagine the carving . . . as a drawing on a piece of paper that is entirely
distinct from the overall shape of the chair”—i.e., “[e]ven if the carving
. . . was removed[,] the shape of the chair . . . would remain unchanged,
and . . . [it] would still be capable of serving a useful purpose.”202 The
196. COMPENDIUM, supra note 194, § 924.2(A).
197. Id.
198. Id. § 924.2(B).
199. Id.
200. Id. (“The U.S. Copyright Office applies the conceptual separability test only if it
determines that the useful article contains pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that cannot
be physically separated from that article.”).
201. Id.
202. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976)) (detailing an illustrative list of
additional artistic examples, held to conceptually separable, which included works comprising
“[a]rtwork printed on a t-shirt, beach towel, or carpet,” “[a] colorful pattern decorating the
surface of a shopping bag,” “[a] drawing on the surface of wallpaper,” and “[a] floral relief
decoration the handle of a spoon”); see Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632
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same is true for “an engraving on a vase”—the engraving, albeit not
physically separable, is nevertheless copyrightable because it can be
imagined apart from the vase as a wholly distinct two-dimensional
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, and because, even when it is
removed, the vase, remaining unchanged in shape, is still capable of
serving a useful purpose.203
For a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature to satisfy the
conceptual separability test, the artistic design and the utilitarian
function of the useful article, into which it is incorporated, must be
inherently distinct. Otherwise, where the ornamental elements of a
useful article are inherently the same as its mechanical and utilitarian
function, the pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features of that useful article
are neither capable of conceptual separability nor entitled to copyright
protection. Notably, however, the mere fact that “a useful article could
have been designed differently[,] or . . . that an artistic feature is not
necessary to or dictated by the utilitarian aspects of that article is
irrelevant to this analysis.”204 Moreover, where the artistic feature
comprises “an integral part of the overall shape or contour of the useful
article, that feature cannot be considered conceptually separable because
removing it would destroy the basic shape of the useful article.”205 In
other words, when the ornamental form and the utilitarian function of a
useful article are perfectly married—i.e., each artistic design element of
the useful article is dictated and/or simultaneously influenced by its
functional features—the incorporated pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
features of that article are not copyrightable.206
2. The Independent-Existence Requirement
“To satisfy the independent-existence requirement, the [artistic]
feature must be able to exist as its own pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
work once it is imagined apart from the useful article”207—i.e.,
independence manifests in the physical or conceptual separability of the
F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that, although belt buckles are ordinarily utilitarian objects
not subject to copyright protection, belt buckles comprising sculptural designs cast in precious
metals, which are decorative in nature and utilized primarily as jewelry by wearers, are
nevertheless copyrightable because they contain “conceptually separable sculptural
elements,” employed primarily for ornamentation, that, despite being physically invisible, are
inherently distinct “from their subsidiary utilitarian function”).
203. COMPENDIUM, supra note 194, § 924.2(B).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Rather, when form and function are perfectly married, intellectual property rights in
the artistic design are limited exclusively to design patentability, not copyright protection.
207. Star Athletica L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1005 (2017).
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artistic design from the useful article.208 However, if the ornamental
design feature “could not exist as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work
on its own,” it necessarily fails the independent-existence requirement,
as “it is simply one of the article’s utilitarian aspects.”209 Thus, when
confronting the independent-existence requirement, the threshold
inquiry is whether “the separately identified feature has the capacity to
exist apart from the utilitarian aspects of the article.”210
Importantly, because “[t]he focus of the separability inquiry is on
the extracted feature,” and not those aspects of the useful article that
remain subsequent to the imaginary or literal extraction, “[t]he statute
does not require the decisionmaker to imagine a fully functioning useful
article without the artistic feature”—that is, in determining whether an
artistic feature is capable of independent existence, there is no statutory
mandate that a non-artistic replacement for the removed feature be
imagined.211 Consequently, to establish independent existence under the
Copyright Act, the controlling statutory language only “requires that the
separated feature qualify as a [non-useful] pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work on its own.”212 Therefore, adhering to these statutory
bounds, and in accordance with the independent-existence requirement,
the useful article doctrine provides that “a feature of the design of a
useful article is eligible for copyright [protection] if, when identified and
imagined apart from the useful article, it would qualify as a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work either on its own or when fixed in some other
tangible medium” of expression.213

208. Brief for the Respondents at *29, Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137
S. Ct. 1002 (2017) (No. 15-866) (“Independence is established if an artistic feature is either
physically separable from the useful article (e.g., a hood ornament on a car) or conceptually
separable (e.g., a carving on the back of a chair).”).
209. Star Athletica L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. at 1005.
210. Id. at 1010 (“[T]he feature must be able to exist as its own pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work as defined in [Section] 101 once it is imagined apart from the useful article.
If the feature is not capable of existing as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work once
separated from the useful article, then it was not a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature of
that article, but rather one of its utilitarian aspects.”).
211. Id. at 1013-14 (“[B]ecause the removed feature may not be a useful article—as it
would then not qualify as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work—there necessarily would be
some aspects of the original useful article ‘left behind’ if the feature were conceptually
removed. But the statute does not require the imagined remainder to be a fully functioning
useful article at all, much less an equally useful one.”).
212. Id. at 1013.
213. Id. at 1012.
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VI. A RECOMMENDATION FOR A NEW, MORE DISCRIMINATING
DOCTRINE OF SEPARABILITY, DELINEATING A CATEGORICAL TEST FOR
“ARTICLE OF MANUFACTURE” IDENTIFICATION WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF SECTION 289, IN DESIGN PATENT LAW
“[I]f history is our guide to the proper definition of ‘article of
manufacture,’ there is more the [United States Supreme] Court could
have done [in Samsung;] [f]or while [it is] true that not all articles of
manufacture are complete commercial products, neither should all
components be considered articles of manufacture.”214 Particularly,
while the Supreme Court correctly asserts that the “article of
manufacture” in Section 289 of the Patent Act need not necessarily be
the complete commercial product sold to consumers, but may, in some
circumstances, be a lesser component thereof, its inordinately broad
dictionary-based definition of the statutory term fundamentally fails to
demonstrate when the relevant “article of manufacture” should be
treated as the whole commercial product or as some smaller unit; nor
does it announce a definitive categorical framework for identifying the
relevant article where it is less than the product as a whole.215 Thus,
standing alone, the Court’s definition critically fails to resolve
foundational distinctions in the protected scope of multi-component
devices.
This Article proposes a comprehensive test for “identifying the
relevant article of manufacture at the first step of the [Section] 289
damages inquiry.”216 Finding inspiration in the copyright doctrine of
separability, it identifies a statutory framework, judiciously delineating
a more standardized approach to “article of manufacture” identification
in multi-component devices, that advances a more workable and

214. McKenna, supra note 8.
215. See id. (“[T]he Court gave no guidance as to when courts should treat the relevant
article of manufacture as the commercial product or as some smaller unit, nor did it explain
how one should identify the relevant article if it is less than the product as a whole.”); see also
Ronald Mann, Opinion analysis: Justices tread narrow path in rejecting $400 million award
for Samsung’s infringement of Apple’s cellphone design patents, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 6,
2016, 4:09 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/12/opinion-analysis-justices-tread-narrow
-path-in-rejecting-400-million-award-for-samsungs-infringement-of-apples-cellphone-designpatents/ [https://perma.cc/6BMB-EH88] (“The opinion . . . offers no guidance on how one
might go about distinguishing the ‘article of manufacture’ of relevance from the actual
cellphones at issue. [It is] not just that the opinion [does not] specify the relevant article of
manufacture (the case? the screen? both?)—the opinion [does not] even instruct the Federal
Circuit definitively to reject the entire cellphone as the article of manufacture.”); see also Rao,
supra note 7 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision was limited in that it provided no clarification
regarding the manner in which the ‘relevant “article of manufacture” ’ is determined.”).
216. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 580 U.S. 53, 62 (2016).
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consistent standard for determining when the relevant “article of
manufacture” should comprise the whole commercial product or some
smaller unit.
More precisely, through the development of a
“separability” test, it establishes a constructive foundation of legal
guidance that is capable of distinguishing the components of a claimed
design, comprising distinct parts of the whole commercial product, that
constitute the relevant “article of manufacture” from those that are
merely incorporated features of the whole commercial product.
A. The Problem with the Supreme Court’s Modern Reading of the Term
“Article of Manufacture” in Section 289 of the Patent Act
The United States Supreme Court’s dictionary-based interpretation
of the term “article of manufacture” forms an incomplete and generally
unqualified definition of the statutory phrase that fundamentally fails to
pragmatically achieve its deliberate purpose. Significantly, while the
U.S. Supreme Court’s reconceptualization of the Section 289 term of art
was intended to “encompass[] both a product sold to a consumer and a
component of that product,”217 its compilation of incredibly vague
terminology, as adopted in the definition of “article of manufacture,”
fails to demonstrate this “either-or” objective. Instead, the Court, by
utilizing this hopelessly overbroad language, unwittingly misconstrues
the intended scope of the statutory term: the term “article of
manufacture,” as broadly construed in this definition, could “be read as
suggesting that any ‘component’ can be an ‘article of manufacture’ for
the purposes of [Section] 289.”218 Therefore, neither “the Federal
Circuit’s narrower reading of ‘article of manufacture’ ” nor the Supreme
Court’s broader interpretation of the statutory term of art can be fitly
“squared with the text of [Section] 289.”219
B. The Proposed Design Patent Separability Test for Determining the

217. Id. at 434.
218. Burstein, supra note 8, at 67 (emphasis added); see Risch, supra note 185
(demonstrating how the U.S. Supreme Court’s broad, dictionary-based definition of the
statutory term can be misinterpreted in this way); see also Shara Tibken, Apple and Samsung
face off in court over design patents once again, CNET (May 10, 2018, 5:00 AM PT),
https://www.cnet.com/news/apple-and-samsung-face-off-again-in-san-jose-california-courtover-design-patents/ [https://perma.cc/2D8J-FCE5?type=image] (misconstruing the Supreme
Court’s decision to mean that, while “[p]reviously, an infringing ‘article of manufacture’
[could be] considered [the] entire device[,] [n]ow an article of manufacture can be only a small
portion of [the] device”).
219. Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 61.
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Relevant “Article of Manufacture” in Section 289 of the Patent Act
An appropriate test for identifying the relevant “article of
manufacture” for a multi-component device at step one of the Section
289 damages inquiry is: a component-part of the whole commercial
product shall be deemed the relevant “article of manufacture” in Section
289 of the Patent Act if, and only to the extent that, it is (1) physically
separable from, and (2) capable of existing independently of the whole
commercial product sold to consumers.
First, to be physically separable at step one of the proposed test, a
component must have the capacity to be physically removed from the
complete commercial product by ordinary means, while keeping intact
its tangible form and recognizably distinct features.220 However, where
a component, comprising an ornamental configuration or decorative
embodiment, cannot be physically detached from the entire commercial
product but may only achieve separability through conceptual means, it
must necessarily fail the physical separability requirement, as
imaginative extraction ought never to be an acceptable substitute for
actual extraction.221 Notably, that a conceptually separable design
cannot sufficiently satisfy the physical separability requirement, at step
one of the proposed test, is neither inconsistent with the fundamental
principles of design patent law nor the general precepts derived
therefrom.222 Therefore, if, at step one of the proposed test, a
component-part is determined to be physically separable from the whole
commercial product, the “article of manufacture” inquiry must proceed
to step two, and the central question should inexorably become one of
independent existence. Otherwise, when a component of the complete
commercial product fails to satisfy the physical separability requirement,
the proposed separability test terminates at step one, and the whole
commercial product shall constitute the relevant “article of
manufacture,” not the component.
Next, at step two of the proposed test, for a physically separable
component of the whole commercial product to sufficiently satisfy the
independent-existence requirement, it must be able to exist on its own as
a single unitary structure, having a concrete and physical form that is
complete in itself for use or for sale. To be “complete,” under the legal
framework advanced herein, the component need not necessarily be the
220. Importantly, so understood, the classification of physical separability, as applied in
this proposed identification test, is consistent with that of the copyright laws.
221. Note that the conceptual separability terminology adopted herein likewise parallels
that of the modern separability doctrine to copyright law.
222. See discussion infra Section VI.B.1.
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“ultimate product sold [to] or used by the ultimate consumer.”223
Instead, within the statutorily defined bounds of this test, a component
may be considered “complete” insofar as it is distributed for the
fundamental purpose of downstream incorporation—i.e., its subsequent
contribution to or integration in the final commercial product marketed
to and enjoyed by the end consumer. Therefore, when confronting the
independent-existence requirement, the threshold inquiry is whether the
component can exist apart from the whole commercial product,
notwithstanding the fact that it can be physically separated.
Accordingly, under the modern separability test to design patent law, as
announced in this Article, a component of the whole commercial product
should be treated as the relevant “article of manufacture” if, when
physically separated from the entire commercial product sold to
consumers, it would qualify, on its own, as an independently discrete and
otherwise complete item for use or for sale. Conversely, where a
component of the entire commercial product constitutes a purely
decorative or ornate feature applied to or embodied in the ultimate
product’s overall design, the whole commercial product, and not a
component of that product, must be treated as the relevant “article of
manufacture.” Likewise, where a component of the whole commercial
product is neither physically separable from nor capable of existing
independently of the finished commercial product sold to or used by
consumers, the relevant “article of manufacture” at step one of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Section 289 damages inquiry must necessarily
comprise the whole commercial product, not a lesser component thereof.
This statutory framework forms a universally applicable test for
determining the relevant “article of manufacture” at step one of the
Section 289 damages inquiry that properly balances the ever-present
tension between consistency and flexibility in the practice of design
patent law. On the one hand, courts require a legal framework for
“article of manufacture” identification that breeds consistency through
uniformity by establishing a categorical blueprint that juries may
unambiguously follow with confidence and ease. The proposed test
offers this consistency. On the other hand, courts also need the
flexibility to tailor the language utilized in the statutory framework for
“article of manufacture” determinations to the myriad of fundamentally
distinct patented designs and the innumerous, factually unique
circumstances they pose. The separability test for “article of

223. Burstein, supra note 8, at 62.
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manufacture” identification, proposed herein, likewise offers this
flexibility.
For a demonstration on how the recommended “article of
manufacture” identification test advanced in this Article is applied, and
why it introduces a practical statutory framework for determining the
relevant “article of manufacture” at step one of the Section 289 damages
inquiry, consider the following examples.
1. The Proposed Design Patent Separability Test Applied to: The
Carpet Cases
Consider first a design patent for the surface ornamentation of a
carpet. Generally, as a fundamental principle of design patent law,
where there exists a design for surface ornamentation, it is invariably
presumed that the design, for which surface ornamentation is claimed, is
inseparable from the article to which it is applied, as the design itself is
incapable of existing alone—that is, the capacity for separability
possessed by a design for surface ornamentation is purely conceptual.224
Thus, to achieve design patent protection, a design for surface
ornamentation must necessarily comprise a definite pattern of surface
ornamentation applied to the relevant “article of manufacture.”225
Significantly, then, a finding of mere conceptual separability—i.e., that
a design, albeit physically inseparable, is nevertheless capable of being
imagined separately from, or visualized independently of the whole
commercial product sold to or used by consumers—is fundamentally
determinative of whether the relevant “article of manufacture” must be
treated as the whole commercial product or some lesser component
thereof.
Accordingly, here, under the guidance of the proposed separability
test, the relevant “article of manufacture” in a patented design for carpets
would comprise the whole commercial product—i.e., the ultimate carpet
sold to consumers, in its entirety—and not some lesser component
thereof—i.e., the design for surface ornamentation applied to or
embodied in the carpet itself. More specifically, because the ornamental
surface design featured on a carpet constitutes a purely decorative
element that is physically inseparable, or merely conceptually separable,
from the carpet itself, the whole carpet, as opposed to the design for
surface ornamentation subsumed thereon, must be treated as the relevant
“article of manufacture.”

224. See Quinn, supra note 19.
225. Id.
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This conclusion is further corroborated by an application of the
proposed “article of manufacture” identification test delineated herein.
The physical separability requirement, announced at step one of the
proposed test, is satisfied only when a component, incorporated into the
overall design of an article, can be physically removed from the whole
commercial product while simultaneously keeping intact a recognizably
distinct and individually tangible form apart from that product.
Otherwise, where a component of the whole commercial product is
subject exclusively to imaginative extraction, it is conceptually
separable and, thus, fundamentally incapable of satisfying the physical
separability requirement, as there is no substantively discrete or tangible
form, apart from the whole commercial product, to which de facto
separability could meaningfully attach. Consistent with this distinction,
under the proposed framework, an ornamental surface design applied to
or embodied in a carpet is physically inseparable, or merely conceptually
separable, from the whole carpet sold to consumers for use or for sale.
To the extent that the design for surface ornamentation, when taken
apart from the carpet itself, neither possesses an individually tangible
form, discrete from that of the whole carpet, nor is capable of being
physically detached from the ultimate carpet sold to consumers, it is
evident that no physical separability exists.
Thus, because a
determination of conceptual separability, generally being the antithesis
to a finding of physical separability, cannot effectively satisfy the de
facto separability requirement, and because an ornamental surface
design, as applied to or embodied in a carpet, is characteristically subject
exclusively to conceptual separability, a design for the surface
ornamentation of a carpet must necessarily fail the physical separability
requirement at step one of the proposed test. This failure thereby
necessitates an immediate termination of the recommended test at step
one, precipitately prompting an accelerated “article of manufacture”
determination irrespective of the step two independent-existence
requirement.
Therefore, under this Article’s proposed “article of manufacture”
identification test, and pursuant to Section 289 of the Patent Act, upon
infringement, the holder of a patent claiming the ornamental surface
design of a carpet is entitled to the total profits earned by the infringer
from the manufacture and sale of the whole infringing carpet.
2. The Proposed Design Patent Separability Test Applied to: The
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Piano Cases
For this example, consider a patent covering the design for the outer
casing of a piano.226 The proposed separability framework for “article
of manufacture” identification at step one of the Section 289 damages
inquiry demonstrates that, as applied here, the relevant “article of
manufacture” would comprise the component—i.e., the outer casing of
the piano—rather than the ultimate commercial product sold to
consumers—i.e., the whole piano, sold in its entirety. Namely, the
ornamental design for the outer piano case must be treated as the relevant
“article of manufacture” because, irrespective of its innards, the outside
casing of the piano is not only physically separable from the whole
commercial product but is also capable of existing on its own, as an
independently discrete and otherwise complete item for use or for sale.
Put differently, because the outer casing, even when physically removed
from the innards of the piano, is still capable of being identified
separately from, and existing independently of the whole piano sold to
consumers, the outer casing of the piano, less the innards of the finished
product, must necessarily constitute the relevant “article of
manufacture” in Section 289 of Patent Act.
When applying the proposed “article of manufacture” identification
test, delineated herein, it becomes clear that the outer shell of a piano,
separate from the piano as a whole, does not comprise a merely
ornamental feature or decorative characteristic that is unable to exist
absent the inclusion of its inner components. To the extent that the
piano’s exterior can be selected separately from the piano’s interior, it is
evident that the physical separability requirement, at step one of the
proposed test, is satisfied. More specifically, that there are several
alternatives, which, taken together, categorically favor the power of
preference, plainly demonstrates that, as is consistent with step one of
the proposed test, the outer casing of the piano has the capacity to be
physically removed from the complete piano by ordinary means while
keeping intact its tangible form and recognizably distinct features.
Likewise, when considering the independent-existence requirement at
step two of the proposed test, the diversity in selection further confirms
that the outer casing of a piano is capable of existing on its own as a
single unitary structure, having a concrete and physical form that is
complete in itself for use or for sale. Notably, under step two of the
226. For this example, imagine a set of circumstances that are factually identical to those
in the Piano cases, where “[a] purchaser desiring a piano of a particular manufacturer may
have the piano placed in any one of several cases dealt in by the maker.” Bush & Lane Piano
Co. v. Becker Bros., 222 F. 902, 903 (2d Cir. 1915).
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proposed test, and within the framework of Section 289, a design for the
outer casing of a piano, although not the ultimate product sold to or used
by the ultimate consumer, is nevertheless complete insofar as is it is
supplied with the fundamental purpose of being incorporated into the
final piano marketed to and enjoyed by the end purchaser.
Therefore, under the test for “article of manufacture” identification
proposed herein, the “total profits” remedy provision of the Patent Act
provides that, upon infringement, the owner of a design patent claiming
the outer casing of a piano is only entitled to the infringer’s total profits
from the manufacture or sale of the infringing piano case, and not to the
infringer’s total profits from the manufacture or sale of the entire piano.
3. The Proposed Design Patent Separability Test Applied to: A
Pencil Eraser
Now consider a hypothetical design patent for the ornamental shape
of a pencil eraser.227 Applying the separability test for “article of
manufacture” identification advanced herein, the relevant “article of
manufacture” would be the component—i.e., the eraser itself—not the
entire commercial product sold to consumers—i.e., the pencil as a
whole. Particularly, to the extent that the ornamental design for an
eraser, irrespective of its shape or configuration, is almost invariably
detachable, by ordinary means, from the pencil as a whole, while
simultaneously keeping intact a recognizably distinct and tangible form
apart from the pencil, it is manifestly apparent that the physical
separability requirement, at step one of the proposed test, is effectively
achieved.
Moreover, advancing to the independent-existence
requirement at step two of the proposed test, it is also evident that the
eraser, when physically separated from the pencil as a whole, is able to
exist on its own as a single unitary structure, having a concrete and
physical form that is complete in itself for use or for sale. Specifically,
this satisfaction of the independent-existence requirement is
fundamentally demonstrated through the physically separated pencil
eraser’s capacity to subsist in several distinct forums and/or figurations,
whether that be its attachment to a different writing apparatus—i.e., a
mechanical pencil, a pen, a crayon, a colored pencil, or a marker—or its
continuation as a sundered object, affixed to nothing at all—i.e., a
freestanding eraser, wholly detached from all writing mechanisms.

227. For this example, assume that the writing utensil in question is a standard No. 2
pencil, having a rubber eraser, comprising a specific shape, mounted to one end.
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Significantly, then, at step two of the proposed test, and consistent with
the independent-existence framework introduced therein, a design for
the eraser of a pencil is complete insofar as it can be either the ultimate
product sold to or used by the ultimate consumer or some lesser
component thereof, wholesaled to an intermediary purchaser for the
singular purpose of subsequent downstream incorporation.
Therefore, under this Article’s proposed test for “article of
manufacture” identification, and pursuant to the Patent Act’s special
remedies provision, upon infringement, the owner of a design patent
claiming the shape of a pencil eraser is only entitled to the infringer’s
total profits from the manufacture or sale of the infringing eraser, and
not to the infringer’s total profits from the manufacture or sale of the
whole pencil.
4. The Proposed Design Patent Separability Test Applied to: The
Original iPhone
In this example, consider two design patents for the first-generation
iPhone, respectively claiming the ornamental shape of (1) the glass
screen and (2) the black, front-facing rectangular configuration of the
device, comprising rounded corners and a raised rim. Here, under the
test for “article of manufacture” identification advanced in this Article,
whereas, for the former, the relevant “article of manufacture” constitutes
a component of the whole commercial product, for the latter, the relevant
“article of manufacture” comprises the whole commercial product itself.
Specifically, the relevant “article of manufacture” for the ornamental
design of the glass screen would be a component—i.e., the glass screen
itself—and not the entire commercial product sold to consumers—i.e.,
the whole smartphone; however, the relevant “article of manufacture”
for the ornamental shape of the first-generation iPhone’s black, frontfacing rectangular configuration would be the entire commercial product
sold to consumers—i.e., the whole smartphone—and not a lesser
component of that product—i.e., the design for the ornamental shape or
configuration applied to or embodied in the smartphone itself.
a. The Ornamental Design for the Glass Screen of the FirstGeneration iPhone
The ornamental design for the glass screen of a smartphone must
be treated as the relevant “article of manufacture” because, under the
proposed test, where a “design pertains to a component that a user or
seller can physically separate from the product as a whole, that fact
suggests that the design has been applied to the component alone rather
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than to the complete [commercial] product” sold to or used by
consumers.228 Likewise, to the extent that the glass screen for the mobile
device can be sold separately from the whole commercial smartphone,
as, for instance, a substitute article for replacement purposes, it is
patently true that the independent-existence requirement, at step two of
the proposed test, is also effectively achieved.229
Central to this conclusion is the capacity of the glass screen to be
replaced or serve as a replacement. Particularly, the fact that a defective
glass screen can be detached from an otherwise functioning device and,
where necessary, substituted with an unimpaired equivalent substantially
demonstrates that, congruous with step one of the proposed test, the glass
screen is, indeed, physically separable, as it is capable of being
physically removed from the whole smartphone by ordinary, or not
unduly onerous, means while simultaneously keeping intact its distinct
and tangible form. The same is true at step two of the proposed test.
Namely, because the glass screen, when taken apart from the mobile
device as a whole, has the capacity to exist on its own, through the
contours of a replacement, as a single unitary structure, having a concrete
and physical form that is complete in itself for use or for sale, the
ornamental design for the glass screen of a first-generation iPhone
sufficiently satisfies the proposed criteria for the independent-existence
requirement advanced herein. Thus, within the independent-existence
framework of the proposed test, the glass screen must necessarily be
considered complete insofar as it is distributed purely as a replacement
component for the whole commercial smartphone sold, albeit it being
presumably purchased with the sole objective of subsequent
incorporation into the iPhone and, so understood, individually useless on
its own.
Therefore, under the proposed separability test for “article of
manufacture” identification advocated for in this Article, and pursuant
to Section 289 of the Patent Act, upon infringement, the owner of a
design patent claiming the ornamental shape of the glass screen for the
first-generation iPhone is only entitled to the infringer’s total profits
from the manufacture or sale of the infringing glass screen, and not to
the infringer’s total profits from the manufacture or sale of the whole
smartphone.
228. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, supra note
138, at 29.
229. See id. (“The [design is applied to a component, not the complete product,] . . . if [it]
is embodied in a component that is manufactured separately from the rest of the product[] or
if the component can be sold separately (for instance, for replacement purposes).”).
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b. The Ornamental Design for the Front-Facing Rectangular
Configuration of the First-Generation iPhone
Alternatively, here, the relevant “article of manufacture” in a
patented design for the black, front-facing rectangular configuration of
the first-generation iPhone, unlike that of the glass screen, must
comprise the whole smartphone because, under the proposed test, where
a design constitutes a significant attribute of the whole commercial
product sold, fundamentally influencing the overall appearance of the
product in its entirety, that fact suggests that the design, being embodied
in the complete commercial product itself, must extend beyond any one
component incorporated therein. More simply, notwithstanding the fact
that the design for the black, front-facing rectangular configuration of
the original smartphone is inextricably anchored in the appearance of the
iPhone as a whole, because the ornamental shape of the whole iPhone is
physically inseparable, or only conceptually separable, from the device
itself, it must necessarily fail the physical separability requirement at
step one of the proposed test.
Adhering to the “article of manufacture” identification framework
advanced in this Article, and applying the physical and conceptual
separability distinction adopted at step one of the proposed test, because
the design for the ornamental shape of a mobile device is inexorably tied
to the underlying appearance of the ultimate device marketed to and
enjoyed by consumers, it cannot realistically possess an individually
tangible form, discrete from that of the whole commercial smartphone,
which, in turn, has the capacity to be physically removed from the whole
smartphone by ordinary means. Put differently, to the extent that an
ornamental design for the shape of the first-generation iPhone can only
be imagined away from the overall smartphone as merely a drawing on
a piece of paper, but not as an identifiably separable nor independently
existing object for use or for sale, it is abundantly clear that the design
for the black, front-facing rectangular configuration of the original
smartphone, being only conceptual separable from the smartphone as a
whole, emphatically fails to satisfy the physical separability requirement
at step one of the proposed test. This outright failure to satisfy the
physical separability requirement, at step one, thereby compels an
immediate cessation of the recommended test, instantaneously
prompting a truncated “article of manufacture” determination,
irrespective of the independent-existence requirement at step two.
Therefore, under the proposed separability test for “article of
manufacture” identification advanced herein, Section 289 of the Patent
Act provides that, upon infringement, the owner of a design patent
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claiming the ornamental shape of the black, front-facing rectangular
configuration of the first-generation iPhone is entitled to the total profits
earned by the infringer from the manufacture and sale of the whole
infringing smartphone.
C. The Benefits of Adopting a Comprehensive Test for Determining the
Relevant “Article of Manufacture” in Section 289 of the Patent Act
Simply put, where the scope of the term “article of manufacture” is
vaguely defined, and the identity of a relevant “article” cannot be
conclusively determined, inventors and manufactures cannot reliably
distinguish between those designs that they are legally permitted to
produce and those for which the law would explicitly forbid, as a
fundamental undertaking of design patent infringement.
More
specifically, for so long as there remains ambiguity surrounding how to
determine what constitutes a relevant “article of manufacture,” inventors
will continue to become increasingly dissuaded from introducing new
products to the market, as they lack the intrinsic readiness required to
reasonably ascertain, with more than an iota of certainty, which design
features might constitute a legally protectable “article of manufacture”
under Section 289 of the Patent Act.230 Thus, the definition of the term
“article of manufacture” matters “to anyone who invents, produces,
sells—or, indeed buys—any complex, multicomponent product.”231
And, because “[b]usinesses seek clarity on the law, . . . the possibility of
massive exposure for design patent infringement could have a
[potentially] chilling effect, making companies wary of launching
products.”232
The adoption of a more comprehensive legal approach, in
conjunction with a single, well-defined “article of manufacture”
identification test, such as the one proposed herein, would breed the
uniformity necessary to remedy the current trajectory of the existing
statutory framework to design patent law. More specifically, by

230. See Michael Annis & Myers Dill, For Design Patent Owners (and Alleged
Infringers), The Third Time is Not a Charm, IPWATCHDOG (July 22, 2018, 9:45 AM),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/22/design-patent-owners-alleged-infringers/id=98840/
[https://perma.cc/XTH6-EJQY].
231. Carl Cecere, The ‘Samsung v. Apple’ Retrial is an Opportunity to Solidify Progress
on Design Patents, LAW.COM: NAT’L L.J. (May 1, 2018, 6:26 PM), https://
www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/05/01/the-samsung-v-apple-retrial-is-an-opportunity
-to-solidify-progress-on-design-patents/?slreturn=20200031000522.
232. Ryan Davis, Design Patent Damages Still Murky After $539M Apple Verdict,
LAW360 (May 30, 2018, 8:55 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1048502/design-patentdamages-still-murky-after-539m-apple-verdict.
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establishing a design patent system that has the capacity to enable
stakeholders in design patented works to develop policies and practices
targeted at where the relevant “article of manufacture” is most likely to
be identified, the implementation of such a test would instill confidence
in the larger community; that is, it would furnish a more enabling
environment conducive to lucidity and greater preparedness, wherein the
possibility for early foresight invites the opportunity for precautionary
measures that, if imposed, may minimize the risk of exposure to future
infringement damages and liabilities. A consistently structured and
reliable “article of manufacture” identification test, which explicitly
delineates when the relevant “article” comprises either the entire
commercial product sold or a lesser component therein, would
indubitably stimulate the predictability essential for effectuating a more
efficient system, whereby all parties and innovators possess the requisite
guidance to operate with, at a minimum, a scintilla of confidence.233
Moreover, by employing a more methodical framework for “article of
manufacture” identification at step one of the Section 289 damages
inquiry, the separability test, advanced in this Article, fosters a more
predictable environment that promotes judicial efficiency by substituting
generally debilitating uncertainty with more informative, instruction
forward legal guidance. Importantly, this proposed legal framework will
provide the inventors of design patents with an overriding awareness that
presently does not exist: it will afford a fundamental and anticipatory
understanding, at the forefront of the design patenting process, of the
legal protections likely to be afforded and the range of remedial damages
to which those protections may be entitled upon infringement.
Therefore, the proposed separability test for “article of manufacture”
identification, as advanced in this Article, grants owners of design
patents a prospective knowledge, at the inception of the design patenting
process, and not merely sometime after the infringement has already
transpired, of the general rights and remedies to which they may be
entitled should infringement occur.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Samsung represents
a meaningful transformation in the law concerning damages under
Section 289 of the Patent Act;234 however, more than its general rejection
of “the idea that [the] ‘article of manufacture’ must be the finished
233. See Rao, supra note 7.
234. See generally Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 580 U.S. 53, 56-62 (2016).
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product sold to consumers,” the Court’s exceedingly broad opinion
remains profoundly ambiguous.235 The Supreme Court’s overly
simplified reading of the term “article of manufacture” extends little
guidance on a decisive issue in design patent law: how to identify the
relevant article of manufacture in a multifaceted product. Significantly,
however, while “article of manufacture” identification can and will
continue to present challenges for courts confronting the Section 289
special remedies provision, devising a more consistent identification
framework to be applied at step one of the damages inquiry would
substantially mitigate that difficulty.
This Article advances a comprehensive test for “identifying the
relevant article of manufacture at the first step of the [Section] 289
damages inquiry.”236 More specifically, finding inspiration in the
copyright doctrine of separability, this test delineates an appropriate
framework for determining when the relevant “article of manufacture”
should comprise the whole commercial product or some smaller unit.
Through the lens of a “separability” analysis, this test advances a
constructive foundation of legal guidance, whereby it establishes a more
workable standard for distinguishing those components of a claimed
design, comprising distinct parts of the whole commercial product, that
constitute the relevant “article of manufacture” from those that are
merely incorporated features of the whole commercial product. If
implemented, this modern separability framework to design patent law
would establish predictability through the furtherance of clearer
guidelines; therefore, the adoption of the multi-component test for
identifying the relevant “article of manufacture” at step one of the
Section 289 damages inquiry, as proposed in this Article, would
indubitably foster consistency in design patent law.

235. Daniel Fisher, Samsung Wins At Supreme Court In $400 Million Battle Over Apple
iPhone Design, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2016, 11:40 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher
/2016/12/06/samsung-wins-at-supreme-court-in-400-million-battle-over-apple-iphone-design/
#1682c0e54e81 [https://perma.cc/6MU6-GASY].
236. Samsung Elecs. Co., 580 U.S. at 62.

